Pakhtunkhwatimes

Pakistan's Military must surrender control of foreign policy..! By Shiraz Paracha

2011-10-08T11:14:00.000-07:00

Recent arbitration by the Saudi intelligence agency in the ongoing ‘CIA-ISI war’ is yet another proof that Pakistan is in a dangerous mess created by the military’s illegitimate control over the country’s foreign policy.

Before it is too late, Pakistan needs a radical change in terms of reorganizing internal power centers. Adventurous generals must be reined in and should be no longer be allowed to impose their outdated foreign policy perceptions. As a significant stakeholder, the military can give advice on foreign policy issues but it must not solely shape or dictate the contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

A country’s foreign policy is formulated not on the basis of paranoia and true or false security concerns. Trade and economic interests are corner stones of a successful foreign policy. A country can’t change her neighbors; it has to live with them. A country which can’t establish friendly or at least working relationship with its neighbors is not considered credible by the international community.

Pakistan is seen as an unreliable state because its generals, not politicians; control the country’s foreign policy. The time has come that for the survival of Pakistan, and to restore its own credibility the military restrain from meddling in the foreign policy.

The majority of Pakistanis are not against India but a few generals are. The people of Pakistan would like to have good relations with India but the military is opposed to the public will. At the same time under the Saudi and American pressure the military has blocked bridge building efforts between Iran and Pakistan. This attitude of the men in uniform has been hurting Pakistan.

The military cannot continue treating the rest of Pakistanis as ‘bloody civilians’ or a heard of sheep. Pakistan needs an army that serves the people of Pakistan, an army that follows law of the land and submits to the writ of an elected representative government. Foreign policy ought to be formulated by the elected civilian government in consultation with properly trained specialists, professionals, academia and other stakeholders.

The military is not the sole interpreter of Pakistan’s national interests. The military is not the institution which should set national or international agenda for Pakistan.

For the last 65 year, the people and all institutions in Pakistan have been hostages at the hands of their own military. In the past generals and commanders considered Pakistan as their personal state. Indeed because of generals’ horrific blunders lives of millions of Pakistanis have been at risk.

Intellectually confused generals like Ayub Khan, Sher Ali Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, Aslam Bag, Hamid Gul, Akhtar Abdur Rahman, Naseerullah Khan Baber, Javed Nasir, Pervez Musharraf and many more tried to implement their flawed perceptions and philosophies in Pakistan by force and manipulation.

Professionally incompetent generals, many of whom were also corrupt and morally bankrupt, put their personal greed and ambitions above Pakistan. Today, the Pakistani society is a sick society due to paranoia and confusions created by a few generals.

The military’s civilian regiments such as the Jamat-e-Islami and other Jihadies have imposed false ideologies and concepts upon the people of Pakistan. Even today, a group of idiots defends those foolish and deadly policies on our television screens. As a consequence Pakistan’s faces a huge PR crisis.

The military has been involved in clandestine operations and deals and often the country’s civilian leadership is not informed. In fact an independent investigation would reveal that some in the Pakistan military have been pursuing criminal agendas at the cost of Pakistan and its people. Military coups and generals’ unlawful interference in foreign and domestic policies have harmed Pakistan. Some Pakistani generals think that only they know what is good for Pakistan. This selfish and foolish approach has almost destroyed Pakistan.

It is sad to observe that despite recent debacles no lessons have been learnt and there are no visible signs of change in the military mindset. Discussions and the tone at Corps Commanders’ meetings have not been appropriate. Corps Commanders act as an alternative Cabinet and generals present themselves as defective rulers of Pakistan. With military’s such behavior Pakistan will continue suffering humiliation after humiliation on the national and international fronts.

The current military leadership can turn the page. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and his colleagues can change the culture of contempt that exists in the military ranks for the Parliament and the elected government. General Kayani will earn true respect and will leave a positive legacy behind if he could take the first step and teaches his fellow commanders that they have to bow to the will of the people and obey the law, not violate it. Half of the Pakistan’s troubles can end if some in its military stop operating above and beyond the law.

Shiraz Paracha is a journalist and analyst. He can be reached at: shiraz_paracha@hotmail.com

VIEW: Support for a killer —Naeem Tahir

2011-10-08T11:09:00.000-07:00

Source: Daily Times Saturday, October 08, 2011

The groups that are supporting Qadri, a murderer, need to be understood. Their mindset is causing the disintegration of this society and breaking it into pieces. Quite obviously, they do not believe in the law and the system of justice otherwise they would let the law take its course and respect its decision

The court has convicted the killer, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, on two counts and imposed the death sentence. Mumtaz Qadri killed, in cold blood, the governor of Punjab province, Mr Salmaan Taseer, when he stepped out of a restaurant after lunch with a friend in Islamabad. Mumtaz Qadri, who was Taseer’s on-duty guard and was expected to protect him, instead fired several bullets into Mr Taseer causing almost instantaneous death. There was no provocation at the time. The killer had planned for an opportune moment and acted accordingly. There was little confusion about the murderer as Qadri confessed to the killing and there was no shortage of evidence.

On the arrest of Qadri, and his subsequent appearances in court, he was supported by some lawyers and others, and even garlanded by them. If Salmaan Taseer’s murder shocked the world, the public support for Qadri was no less shocking. Some religio-political parties continued to pressurise the case, making even hearing of the case difficult. However, the court saved its honour, examined the facts and sentenced the killer to death. Now the same political and so-called religious groups are taking to the streets to influence the courts where an appeal has been filed.

Should society remain silent and let whatever is happening happen? Do we have any conscience? Do we realise our social responsibility? Do we even realise moral and religious responsibility? Is our religion only of use to exploiters who can twist it for some political power and blackmail? How can anyone justify the killing of one person by another just because they have a difference of views?

Friday, October 7, was announced as a day of street protests by a group of extreme right groups like Sunni Tehreek, Sunni Ulema Council, Sunni Ittehad Council, Jamiat Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami. They chose this day, Friday, because it is easy to collect people from their mosque networks, whip up the sentiments of those present and then encourage them to take to the streets, as if these namazis (worshippers) were doing a religious duty.

The groups that are supporting Qadri, a murderer, need to be understood. Their mindset is causing the disintegration of this society and breaking it into pieces. Quite obviously, they do not believe in the law and the system of justice otherwise they would let the law take its course and respect its decision. Is such intimidation of the court in itself not a cognisable offence? One wonders about the real purpose of these rallies. These rallies have a cost in time and money and the leaders of these groups are only trying to show off their strength. They are clearly supporters of terrorism. They would probably want to have their brand of justice administered in the streets, little different from the mob that lynched the two innocent boys in Sialkot. I do not know much about other groups but I doubt if Maulana Abul Ala Maududi would have ever allowed the stance adopted by the current ‘Amir-e-Jamaat’. About the other groups, one can say that they are mostly the political wings of the terrorists in the country. They speak for the sections of society that have been brainwashed into twisted versions of Islam just like the Taliban and its young recruits have been. This is organised promotion of anger, taking the law into individual hands and making decisions on the streets. Seen in this perspective, it can be termed as an uprising against the country. It needs to be taken up seriously. Those sections of the provincial governments and political groups that enjoy destabilising the country must be dealt with according to the constitution. A government that turns a blind eye to these happenings is lacking in its duties. The government must ensure protection to the courts to enable them to uphold the law of this land.

The courts indeed have enhanced their prestige in recent days. Their decisions in the Sialkot lynching case, Malik Qadri case and their objective findings of the causes of the Karachi unrest have raised their respect in the public eye by several notches. At the moment, the judiciary is one institution that is functioning while all other pillars of state are subject to question. All persons, groups and institutions must review and rationalise their style of covert actions. The street action to influence the courts is a ‘covert’ action to intimidate. I suppose it would be an appropriate issue for a suo motu.

Finally, staying silent is not helping the saner sections of society. Nor does it help in developing civil society. We all need to contribute, even in conversation, dialogue, lectures, all and any method of communication that an individual has access to and try to restore sanity. Let us not allow street decisions be the winning sentiment. Unfortunately, this is what has been happening so far. The most recent case is the restoration of electricity. We all know that electricity potential has always been present in Pakistan. Why did the government wait until the public took to the streets? Did anyone realise the cost of this power disruption? Please let us live in some peace. Have the grace to look at yourselves and analyse the consequences of your actions. Consider this country your own and treat it as such. Consider these people your people with equal rights, as you want for yourselves. Give yourselves some moments to think and bring about change; cynicism and lack of faith will not help but some decent effort will.

The writer is a culture and media management specialist, a researcher, author, director and actor

ANALYSIS: India-Afghanistan alliance: implications for Pakistan? —Farhat Taj

2011-10-08T11:01:00.001-07:00

Source: Daily Times, October 8, 2011

The PPP-led political leadership, despite its disagreement with the security establishment, has become part of the establishment’s lethal strategic depth policy since it has not asserted its legal right over foreign policy

Afghanistan and India have signed a wide-ranging strategic partnership agreement during the recent visit of Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai to India. The agreement expands trade relations between the two countries, affirms Afghanistan’s support for India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and, most importantly, “India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces” so as to help prepare the armed forces for security responsibilities in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of US forces from the country in 2014.

This agreement implies that the nightmare apprehensions of Pakistan’s security establishment about Afghanistan have been realised. The agreement undermines the establishment’s policy of ‘strategic depth’, a policy to ensure, by violence if necessary, a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan to offset Indian influence in the country. Fear of encirclement by India, regarded as an existential rival by the security establishment of Pakistan, has motivated the latter to suppress Pakhtun nationalism on both sides of the Durand Line since the creation of the Pakistani state, create and nurture armed Islamist proxy groups — the mujahideen in the 1980s and Taliban in the 1990s — and play a double role of ally and enemy in the US-led war on terror since 2001. The agreement came in the context of tense US-Pakistan relations over the issue of the Haqqani Taliban and amid Afghanistan’s accusations of Pakistan’s involvement in the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the peace envoy of Afghanistan. No one in the world seems to be sympathetic to the view that Pakistan too has legitimate interests in Afghanistan that might be undermined by growing Indian influence in that country. This is the ‘reward’ of the strategic depth policy devised and followed by generals with a tunnel vision.

Islamabad could have wielded greater influence in Kabul than Delhi if it had adopted a people-centred approach with focus on human development and trade, coupled with respect for Afghanistan’s sovereign right to have an independent foreign policy. Pakistan’s extensive physical border with Afghanistan, Kabul’s dependence on Islamabad for access to the Arabian Sea and, above all, Pakistan’s large Pakhtun population, if integrated with the Pakistani state though the rule of law, human development and democratic participation in state affairs, would have provided stable leverage to Pakistan over India in terms of influence in Afghanistan. Instead, Pakistan adopted proxy militant groups waging jihad in Afghanistan and broke down the Pakhtun culture through systemic Arabisation of society to hide the generals’ ambitions in Afghanistan with engineered Pakhtun support.

This violence has devastated not only Afghanistan but Pakistan too, especially FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Today, Pakistan stands at a point where, despite all death and destruction to prevent India from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan, Delhi and Kabul stand united and it is Pakistan that appears isolated in the region and the wider world as a state nurturing terrorism. Moreover, Pakistan is hated by Afghans, Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun alike, and the Pakistani state stands discredited in the eyes of its own citizens suffering in terror, especially in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Most analysts are already expressing the fear that the agreement will lead Pakistan to intensify its proxy war in Afghanistan to prevent Indian military training of Afghan security forces. This fear is not misplaced given the political realities in Pakistan. The PPP-led political leadership of Pakistan, which does not support the idea of controlling Afghanistan through violence, does not control the foreign policy of the country vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India. In the recent All Parties Conference (APC) convened in the context of US pressure on Pakistan, the ruling political alliance lined up behind the establishment together with the unelected pro-establishment political parties, including sectarian parties that have links with sectarian killers. The foreign policy of Pakistan should be run by the political leadership, this being its legal right and duty. By not standing up to the military establishment on this issue, the political leadership of Pakistan has become part of the daily acts of terrorism against the innocent people of Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is no neutral position on foreign policy in the current security crisis. Either you lead the establishment or are led by it. The PPP-led political leadership, despite its disagreement with the security establishment, has become part of the establishment’s lethal strategic depth policy since it has not asserted its legal right over foreign policy.

The APC resolution already suggested talks with the Taliban ‘to give peace a chance’. The suggestion will now be put into practice with full force. This implies that there will be no fundamental shift in the foreign policy or national interests as perceived by the security establishment. Pakistan will take no action against the terror groups on its soil to prevent them from attacks inside Afghanistan. Like in the past, there will be agreements with the al Qaeda-led Taliban disguised as ‘agreements with the tribes’ to entrench al Qaeda and Taliban control over FATA even further. The security establishment will intensify its tactics to divide and rule the ‘bad’ Taliban so as to exert control over them with the aim of ensuring their jihadi energies are directed towards Afghanistan. The Haqqani network, which has been involved in high profile attacks on Indians in Afghanistan in the past, will continue to do so. The abuse of FATA as a strategic space will increase and the people of the region, already overpowered by Pakistani and foreign Islamist militants, will be subjected to more torture and the militant control in the area. In the Pakistani media, the anti-Pakhtun propaganda that the Pakhtun are synonymous with the Taliban and that the Taliban are Pakhtun nationalists will speed up. Pakistani Taliban attacks will also be given a colour of Pakistani Pakhtun ‘anger’ over Indian involvement in Afghanistan.

Some people in the PPP have expressed the fear that the security establishment of Pakistan wants to roll back the legal reforms recently implemented by the PPP-led government, which accorded some human rights to the people of FATA. They suspect that extremely violent events, well planned in advance, will occur in FATA and will be used as justification to withdraw the reforms.

Intensified jihadi activities will not be limited to FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but will spread around Pakistan. Pakistan will stand even more isolated and condemned for jihadi connections in the region and the world. The country, already on a collision course with the world, will appear even more so. The question then is: how long will the world tolerate this terrorism-sponsoring? Time will tell.

The writer is the author of Taliban and Anti-Taliban

DAILY TIMES EDITORIAL: The chickens coming home to roost

2011-09-26T16:58:00.001-07:00

The Special Corps Commanders Conference chaired by COAS General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani expressed its concern over the negative statements emanating from the US. At the same time it rejected all allegations against the ISI regarding support to the Haqqani network. The conference concluded its statement by reiterating the military’s commitment to enduring peace in the region. Centcom Commander General Mattis held meetings with the COAS and CJCSC General Wyne to address the irritants in the Pakistan-US relationship. On the face of it, although not much is known about these exchanges, the tone of the Corps Commanders and the CJCSC appeared to be one of seeking to defuse tensions. This relatively sober response from the top brass of the military should come as no surprise. They know perhaps better than anyone else the stakes involved. Nevertheless, given the unprecedented belligerent tone of the American statements, the defence forces seem to be preparing for the worst case scenario: attacks by the US forces against the Haqqani network’s safe havens in North Waziristan (and perhaps Kurram Agency).

Following in the military’s footsteps, the government seeks to mobilise all the political forces in defence of the country’s sovereignty, implying also defence of the military-dictated foreign and security policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan. After contacting most of the political leadership of the country, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has convened an All Parties Conference on September 29. The purpose obviously is to garner political support across the board for the military’s stance. What helps this process of course is the hackneyed appeal to patriotism, which, as everyone knows, is often the last refuge...

On the other side of the divide, Republican Senator and member of the powerful Armed Services Committee Lindsay Graham wants Pakistan “put on notice” regarding its ties with the Haqqanis. White House adviser David Plouffe says the Obama administration is considering various options to persuade Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network. That could include a suspension of aid, which in any case has been made conditional on cooperation against the network as far as the latest package of $ 1 billion passed by Congress is concerned.

While all this verbal sparring is in progress, Afghanistan has accused Pakistan of firing more than 300 rockets and artillery shells across the border over the last five days, causing civilian casualties and damage. Our military has denied any such barrage. The chorus advocating Afghan retaliation against Pakistan for an earlier alleged barrage was held back by President Karzai in July. However, the cause for concern is that if these bombardments are traced to our side of the border, Kabul would have a strong international diplomatic case for retaliation, particularly since it would be able to point to the cross-border insurgency emanating from safe havens in Pakistan. Needless to say, the issue needs to be understood objectively. Whereas Pakistan stands accused of harbouring and encouraging the Taliban insurgency, Afghanistan (and the US/Nato combine) can at best be blamed for their inability to deny our Taliban (the TTP) safe havens courtesy the Haqqani network in eastern Afghanistan. If Pakistan reserves to itself the right to retaliate across the border for attacks from that side, could not that very argument be turned against Pakistan? Obviously wisdom requires that all sides proceed with caution, exercise restraint in public statements, and ensure that the greater objective of the anti-terrorism campaign, peace in the whole region, is enabled through trilateral cooperation.

As to the reflexive argument in parts of our media that the Haqqanis were sourced by and still retain links with the US, it is a fact that both Washington and Islamabad created, funded, armed, trained and unleashed extremists in the name of jihad, an enterprise that has come back to haunt all sides in this potpourri. The blowback from the ill-thought-through reliance on fanatical forces to wage jihad is now here in full force. However, there is no satisfaction in this prediction coming true. Only a sad wisdom that the chickens are finally coming home to roost. What should not happen however is that fissures between the ‘allies’ cause the terrorists to break out in whoops of joy while they continue their deadly work. *

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\09\27\story_27-9-2011_pg3_1

ROVER’S DIARY: Establishment fails as Pakistanis suffer —Babar Ayaz

2011-09-26T16:48:00.001-07:00

The Pakistani establishment has still not realised that the militant non-state actors nurtured by them are villains. Many have revolted and are fighting the army because they want to bring an Islamic revolution by first creating anarchy in the country

Bad news comes in bundles. And, for Pakistan, these bundles have been coming in a row for the last 64 years, with good news in small packets so seldom that they are not enough to tranquillise our tense nerves. Quickly just review the last few days: floods have swept over southern Sindh killing over 200 people, ruining over one million homes and affecting seven million people’s livelihoods; dengue fever is killing people every day in Punjab, the Taliban are getting active in Karachi where they attacked a senior police official’s residence, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is again proudly claiming the killings of those going to Iran, the army operation continues against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the tribal belt, the US is threatening direct action against the Haqqani group if our army does not move against them, and US-Pakistan relations remain strained since the Raymond Davis incident and operation against Osama by the US.

What is common in this bundle of assorted bad news besides Pakistan? It is the failure of the government — not the present government alone but all the past governments also. While Pakistan’s civil and military establishment continues to blame others for all our miseries, the fact is that we are more responsible for this state of affairs than others. This does not mean that I am unrealistically discounting factors that are beyond our control.

Let us consider all these factors and briefly analyse where our military and civil establishments have failed. It is rightly said that much of the flood that swept the many districts of Sindh was caused by a natural calamity — unprecedented rains. But that is not the whole truth. Badin and the adjoining areas of the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) have not only been inundated because of freak monsoon rains this year. Ever since this drain was made at the cost of over one billion dollars, these areas have been deluged at least 15 times as far as I remember. The LBOD was built with a World Bank loan over many years and the cost overruns were enormous. Even when it was being made to drain waterlogged areas, many Sindhi irrigation engineers objected to its design and predicted that it would add to the problems rather than solve them. The frequency of floods increased once the LBOD was completed because of its design faults. The natural course of draining rainwater is obstructed by the drain, which has given an inlet to the sea during the high tides in the monsoon period. There was another experts group that reported there was a design fault, which should be rectified. But, as happens with all reports, no action was taken. I think the residents and farmers of this area have a strong class-action case against the federal and Sindh governments. They can claim damages worth billions of rupees. The governments cannot just blame nature and go scot-free in this case.

The spreading dengue fever in Punjab is a classic example of what I have been saying for a long time: in the country, where governments have failed in gutter and garbage management, talking of moral issues like corruption and constitutional issues is like talking Sanskrit to the people. A national leader once said, “Well, that is the work of the local governments so why are you blaming us?” I asked him whether it was true that democratic governments usually hate to share power with local leaders, dissolving the local governments when given the first opportunity. I told him that sewerage pipelines were laid with the proud signage of ‘prime minister’s or chief minister’s sewerage programme’. In reply, he only smiled sheepishly.

Because of our health sector’s failure we needed Sri Lankan experts to tell us that it was wrong to assume that dengue mosquitoes only breed in fresh water. Even the government department’s advertisements were based on this misperception. Is it not pathetic that a large city like Lahore has inadequate facilities to meet an outbreak, without even enough platelets separating machines? This is because the health and education sectors are given the last priority by all governments. The Punjab government’s efforts to manage this epidemic so far are a shade better than the management abilities shown by the Sindh government in managing the flood.

The issue of terrorism, whether focused on the recent Karachi attack or in the tribal areas, is inter-related. It is no secret now that in our stupid desire to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, our military establishment instigated an armed insurgency in Afghanistan, which resulted in the Afghan government inviting the Soviets to help them. Then we lured the US into this war, who happily joined to teach the communist Soviets a lesson. We also gave a free hand to Saudi intelligence to operate here and get all the Muslim terrorists from the world to operate from Pakistan. General Zia and US Congressman Charlie Wilson used to boast that they created the Islamic techno-guerrillas. Today, the same are master trainers of second-generation jihadis across the country.

The Pakistani establishment has still not realised that the militant non-state actors nurtured by them are villains. Many have revolted and are fighting the army because they want to bring an Islamic revolution by first creating anarchy in the country. The involved Saudi intelligence nurtured the sectarian organisations fighting their proxy war against Iran. The Iranians have their own militants but cannot match the power of pro-Saudi elements.

The US’s pressure on us to either take action against the Haqqani group, Quetta Shura and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), or else they will take action directly, is increasing every day. What are our options? One, to play tough with the US and its global allies and insist that Pakistan is not supporting Haqqani, Mullah Omar and LeT and think foolishly that we can fool the world; two, to push the Afghan-related groups into Afghanistan and work towards packing up India-specific jihadi groups and three, to launch action against these groups as desired unrealistically by the US. The first option is no more because we also claim that Pakistan can broker peace with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani group, which means we have considerable influence on them. Option two is the least risky and most realistic solution to the mess we have created. And the last option (which is Washington’s first option) is unrealistic because the Pakistani establishment may be a nuclear power but it does not have the will, wherewithal and ability to open other fronts against these jihadi groups. Already the TTP and other jihadi groups, which are allied with al Qaeda, have revolted against the establishment and killed thousands of our soldiers and common people.

Ideally, to regain respect in the world, we need to change our 64-year-old strategy and decide to stop pursuing our foreign policy through militant proxy organisations. This game is over. It is unfortunate that our establishment is finding it hard to accept the reality. It is better they do so soon or else they will have to do it after the country is squeezed economically, politically and, perhaps, militarily. The US should also realise that by putting their boots in Pakistan, they will only help the Islamic militant organisations’ agenda and push the country towards unimaginable chaos and anarchy.

The writer can be reached at ayazbabar@gmail.com

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\09\27\story_27-9-2011_pg3_3

Source:

EDITORIAL: Sleeping with the enemy

2011-09-25T14:59:00.000-07:00

The spate of mutually irritating exchanges between Pakistan and the US in recent days is reaching fever pitch. Stung by forthright accusations of harbouring the Afghan Taliban and especially the Haqqani network in safe havens on Pakistani soil and supporting their attacks on US/Nato/Afghan forces across the border, the government and the military have hit back with equally provocative rejoinders. Prime Minister Gilani advises the US not to send ‘wrong messages’, Foreign Minister Khar warns of the loss of an ally, COAS General Kayani rejects Mullen’s charges. All three nevertheless end on a ‘constructive engagement’ note.

In Pakistan, there has been a lot of noise and fury, full of hollow slogans and chest thumping about our ‘sovereignty’ and how the 180 million people of Pakistan are prepared to defend it against any US-led ‘boots on the ground’ inside Pakistani territory. Sceptics view this chorus as delusionary, misplaced nationalism. Soberer minds recognise that the game is one of brinkmanship, not taking on the world’s sole superpower which, despite its economic troubles, packs the most powerful and overwhelming military punch in the world. Both sides are pushing the envelope to the maximum. The risk is that given the polarisation between public opinion in the two countries, this brinkmanship can spill over into actual confrontation if care is not exercised. There are those amongst us who think we have the US over a barrel and therefore whatever the bluster out of Washington, as the prime minister put it, the US “cannot live with us and cannot live without us”. There may be truth in that assertion, although how far this can be pushed must be a cause for concern. Two points need noting here. Arguably, if we continue to nettle the Americans through our support to extremists who are giving them a bloody nose every so often, the US will, if it is not already, explore options that reduce its logistical dependence on Pakistan. A by-product of this will be immediate and perhaps long term strictures on the political, economic and diplomatic front, which will hurt Pakistan gravely. When and if the US’s hands are freed from the Afghan quagmire, it will not look kindly on our shenanigans. Retribution is the leitmotif of empires. Two, even if the US finds ways to live without us, the question remains, can we live without the US (goodwill)? This is not a time for emotional froth, it is a time for sober reflection where Pakistan’s interests lie and whether these are compatible any longer with the dual policy adopted after 9/11, in which the blood lust in American eyes was sought to be assuaged by cracking down on and delivering al Qaeda, while preserving the Afghan Taliban for a protracted campaign of guerrilla and asymmetrical warfare that has been the hallmark of all resistance movements to foreign occupiers in Afghan history.

As the withdrawal date looms, domestic politics and the exigencies of seeking re-election could tie Obama’s hands to adhere to the declared course. However, a question mark has arisen over the feasibility of the withdrawal plan as announced. In some ways it is natural that in the phase of withdrawal, the Taliban and Haqqani network are stepping up their attacks to strengthen their position in post-withdrawal Afghanistan. The bypassing of the ISI by the US and the Afghan government in negotiations with the insurgents may also be a contributory factor in the escalating seriousness of the ‘state of siege’, particularly in Kabul, which the Afghan government and its allies would like to portray as their secure base. The more that myth is shattered by bold attacks on the US embassy, Nato headquarters and other ostensibly secure establishments, the more the withdrawal plan begins to look unrealistic. The coming vacuum of power has not, and does not seem likely to in the foreseeable future, been filled by the Afghan security forces. Withdrawal of foreign forces may be the harbinger therefore of either a long civil war or the quick running over of the anti-Taliban alliance. Potentially, a Taliban government in Kabul this time will spell trouble for Pakistan in the shape of the Pakistani Taliban. We are crafting the tools of our own destruction unthinkingly. **

source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\09\25\story_25-9-2011_pg3_1

Pakistan’s Quest for History…Mohammad Naeem

2011-09-23T17:19:00.000-07:00

Once in a gathering of journalists and academicians including some Westerners, Iranians, Indians, etc., this scribe heard a Pakistani retired bureaucrat claiming that Pakistani contingents fought in the army of Cyrus the great (some 500BC) as well. His reference was to the Saka warriors in the army of Cyrus. His intentions apparently were to highlight the antiquity and historical legitimacy of Pakistani identity. This left the audience bemused. The claim would have gone as a casual opinion of an individual had not some of the participants later discovered it being seriously discussed in a circle of educated Pakistanis.

Since its birth, Pakistan’s mainstream intellectual elite is grappling with one core issue i.e., what are the causal and elemental factors at the basis of Pakistan identity and nationhood. No satisfying answer has been found to this question yet. Complicating the issue is the fact that there is nothing in terms of native identities that sets Pakistan apart from its neighbours and gives it a distinctiveness of its own. Religion stands out to be the only discriminator more precisely with India, which the elite are desperate to be distinct from. Therefore, native histories have been suppressed and the origin and evolution of Pakistani identity sought in the advent and history of Islam in the Subcontinent especially those elements of Indian Culture influenced by Islam. Official histories and school books have been re-written to highlight the role of Islam in the development of Pakistani nationhood.

But Islam didn’t invent something new; rather most of the time, it modified to varying degrees the ancient and pre-existing cultural traditions of the Subcontinent---transformations that were equally adopted by non-Muslims in many cases. The core of the Sub continental cultural values, nevertheless, remained the same. Moreover, a people sense of antiquity or overall identity doesn’t come from religion alone, that also a universalistic and proselytizing religion like Islam not tied to any particular geography, ethnicity, or group. Sentiments and beliefs e.g., feelings of ethnic solidarity, language affinity, territorial affiliation, shared values, common history, belief in shared destiny, etc., not to mention material dimensions of culture are profoundly at work in the daily lives of a people and shaping their collective views give them a deeper sense of identity and primordial existence.

The other relatively less popular theory of the ancient existence of Pakistani identity has been advocated by the leftist Pakistani elite. Notably, it has been expounded in Itezaz Ahsan’s Indus Saga. The theory asserts that Indus Valley, which comprises the floodplain of Indus River and its tributaries, has been having a civilization i.e., Indus Civilization, distinct from the civilization of the Gangetic Plain i.e., Indian Civilization, farther south throughout the known history. It claims that the genesis of Pakistani identity were contained in the Indus Valley Civilization some 2000 BC. And further that, subsequent invasions and cultural developments only strengthened this identity until it got manifested in the entity of Pakistan. Itezaz Ahsan also coins the idea of the Indus man in contrast to the Indian man as one who “On the one hand, is a family man, an enlightened man non-fundamentalist Muslim, and a brave soldier…On the other, an ostentatious consumerist, a bad administrator, and devoid of civic responsibility”.

Yet to be put to serious scrutiny, the Indus Saga theory appears to be poorly constructed from an academic view-point not incorporating any convincing anthropological, linguistic, ethnographical, and even historical and archeological evidence into its formulation. Some of the things e.g., the role of Indus Valley Civilization in the origination of Pakistani identity have been overly interpreted while others e.g., the unifying impact of the Vedic Civilization on the society of the so-called Indus Valley have been plainly downplayed or flatly denied. Further, the theory can be contested on the ground that today no ethnic group of Pakistan so to say has any memory or sense of continuity from the pre-historic civilizations of the Indus Valley. Most importantly, nothing significant can be found in the histories and traditions e.g., myth of common origin, kinship and filial feelings, etc., of the nationalities of Pakistan that points to the consciousness of oneness or sense of solidarity in them under some ancient Indus Valley identity. Every major nationality of Pakistan is intensely aware of its unique identity although some groups e.g., Punjabis, Kashmirirs, etc. may have relatively stronger affinities.

Another theory of relatively recent origin has been propounded by the “Ghazwa-i-Hind” school of thought. Still nascent, there is no detailed formulation of the theory available yet. But generally, it is also based on the ancient origin hypothesis of the Pakistani identity that came into existence due to invasions from the north and later under the Muslim era united Hindustan for the first time in history and gave it its age of glory. The theory, like the supremacist Nazi ideology, seeks the racist re-assertion of Pakistani identity through the conquest of India and the revival of Muslim legacy in the Subcontinent.

And so goes on the quest for a meaning of Pakistani identity and the invention and re-invention of myth and fiction to resolve the anomalies associated with its birth and find it place and legitimacy in history. All this manipulation of facts and presentation of a one-dimensional view of history that emphasizes the primacy of religion in the formation of national consciousness have resulted in the suppression of native identities and confusion in native communities as to what should be their destinies in terms of cultural development. Even there as well, the approach has not been fair and just. For instance, the mainstream elite has in actuality promoted the Indo-Aryan Muslim history, culture, and values of the communities to the east of Indus as the identity markers of Pakistan and supressed cultures and histories of the Irano-Dardic communities e.g., Baluch, Pashtuns, Baltis, etc. to the west of Indus.

Instead of inventing histories to prove the existence of a non-existent nation, recourse should be made to the original idea of Pakistan as expressed in the acronym “Pakistan” and Pakistan Resolution, which conceived Pakistan as a political union of different nations each having a distinct identity and evolutionary trajectory to become a nation. The sense of unity should come from allegiance to a constitutional structure that recognizes the diversity and provides an environment to the component nations for better realization of their capacities. Fusion into a broader community will occur as a logical consequence of shared struggle and harmonious co-existence through such an arrangement. Peripheral factors like religious bonds, territorial commonalities, cultural linkages, etc. can be favourable conditions for developing a broader national consciousness but not the basis.

The author is a casual writer and can be reached at mnaeem197@gmail.com

ANALYSIS: Liberal façade of strategic depth — II —Farhat Taj

2011-09-23T16:59:00.000-07:00

Contrary to the claims of the defenders of the JI-USIP report who say that it is descriptive, the report is actually prescriptive. It frequently uses the word ‘should’ and pages 44-48 are policy recommendations to the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran

The report, ‘Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite’, by Jinnah Institute (JI) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), is anti-Pakhtun in line with Pakistan’s military establishment’s policy of strategic depth. One of the essentials of the policy is to systematically assassinate the indigenous Pakhtun character, which is basically nationalist and secular in outlook, through Arabising the Pakhtun culture by state-sponsored religious extremism and misrepresentation of the Pakhtun through disinformation. In this policy a Pakhtun can only be a wild religious extremist fighting the proxy wars of the state. Any Pakhtun who does not fit into this picture is not a Pakhtun.

The JI-USIP report misrepresents the Pakhtun by equating them with the Taliban while excluding the Pakhtun who disagree with the Taliban. The report warns of a ‘Pakistani Pakhtun resentment’ in at least four places (Pp 12, 22, 30 and 32) if the Taliban were not accommodated in the future power structure of Afghanistan, but fails to mention even once how Pakistani Pakhtuns have taken up weapons against the Taliban in the form of popular jirga-backed lashkars (private militias) across FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Interactions with families of the assassinated members of the lashkars will reveal to any investigator that they hold none but the ISI responsible for their relatives’ killings to facilitate the Taliban to take control of the Pakhtun through violence and blackmail. Hundreds of thousands of the tribesmen have preferred to live in pathetic conditions in displacement rather than joining the Taliban who pay good salaries to their rank and file. The tribal people displaced in military operations constantly complain that the Pakistan Army deliberately bombarded civilians and purposely avoided hitting the Taliban or letting them relocate to safer places. The report fails to mention even once the Punjabi Taliban, who fill the ranks of the militants operating in Pakhtun areas. The report fails to refer to the growing scientific evidence showing the Pakhtuns’ aversion to the Taliban, such as a recent survey, ‘Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan’, conducted by US researchers, which concludes that out of all the four federating units of Pakistan, people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa dislike militant organisations the most. The JI-USIP report fails to mention that most victims of the Taliban terrorism are the Pakhtun and so how can they support the Taliban.

The report fails to mention how violently the ISI attempted to engineer a socio-political status for the Taliban in the tribal society by replacing the existing tribal order. Pakistan Army’s agreement with al Qaeda-led Taliban commander Nek Muhammad in 2004 paved the way for the assassination of the tribal leaders in the coming weeks, months and years. Some of the elite participants of the JI-USIP report authored books, such as The Al Qaeda Connection and The Scorpion’s Tail, where they claim that the Taliban killed the tribal leaders. This is incorrect — families of the tribal leaders hold the army officers responsible for their killings.

In Kurram, for example, there are certain tribal disputes over land and water and the state since British times until 2007 has been by and large peacefully managing these disputes. Since 2007 the Pakistan state retreated, unleashed the sectarian gangs on the area and brought in their ‘favourites’ — the Haqqani family members — to negotiate a peace deal among the Kurram tribes. The tribal leaders questioned the ‘wak’ (authority) of the Haqqani Taliban, who are outsiders to Kurram, to lead such a jirga. The Haqqani family members told them they have been sent by the ISI to make a peace deal among the tribes. This compelled the Kurram tribal leaders to sit with the Haqqanis, even if both Shia and Sunni tribal leaders of Kurram did not want to involve the Haqqanis in their affairs. This was an attempt by the ISI to implant the Haqqani terrorists in Kurram as respectable leaders so that the pro-establishment elite could argue to the world that there will be a ‘Pakistani Pakhtun resentment’ if the Haqqanis were not included in the Afghanistan power set up.

Contrary to the claims of the defenders of the JI-USIP report who say that it is descriptive, the report is actually prescriptive. It frequently uses the word ‘should’ and pages 44-48 are policy recommendations to the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran.

Nasim Zehra, who questioned my and Dr Taqi’s criticism of the JI-USIP on these pages, provided a full hour in her TV talk show to Sherry Rehman and Moeed Yusuf to discuss the report. In response, Dr Mohammad Taqi suggested to her to provide a similar opportunity to the critics of the report. It is pertinent to mention that some of the critics of the report, such as Kamran Shafi, Marvi Sirmed and Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, do participate in TV discussions over political matters and so they could be provided an opportunity by the electronic media to share their views on the report with the people of Pakistan.

The good news is that radio Deewa, Pashto service of Voice of America’s radio, plans to air a critical debate on the JI-USIP report. This is a welcome step. The debate will break the monopoly of the ‘elite’ over the foreign policy discourse by taking it to the ordinary people of Pakistan, who have suffered the most in the state’s pursuit of the strategic depth policy and will provide a break from the daily pro-establishment views emanating from TV talk shows. Similarly, a still under construction website (http://www.pashtunchronicle.com/) will also contribute to highlight the alternative Pakhtun views often suppressed in the Pakistani media.

The other good thing is that several respectable political analysts of Pakistan have raised valid questions about the JI-USIP report. This, I hope, will prevent the uncritical acceptance of this report in the media, academia and policy circles around the world. Credit should be given to Daily Times for initiating the debate on the report.

(Concluded)

The writer is the author of Taliban and Anti-Taliban

COMMENT: Pakistan’s little Great Game — I —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-09-14T18:05:00.001-07:00

Two generations of Afghans and Pakistanis have been lost to the latter’s misadventure in Afghanistan — the little Great Game that it has sought to play, as the successor to the British, for over four decades now

“When everyone is dead, the Great Game is finished. Not before” — Rudyard Kipling in Kim.

The expression ‘endgame’ has made it to the current geopolitical parlance thanks to its antecedent terms, the ‘tournament of shadows’ used by the imperial Russians and their British counterparts, who used the phraseology ‘The Great Game’ coined by Arthur Conolly aka Khan Ali. The context obviously was the strategic hegemony or balance of power over Central Asia, and Afghanistan happened to alternate between being the buffer state and the battleground in the midst of the great powers of the time.

Many want to know what the endgame in the Afghanistan will be like in the present conflict. Kipling, who subsequently popularised the phrase, the Great Game, had cogently answered them in two words noted above. Every single one of the so-called players on the grand chessboard that has partaken in sowing the winds of death in Afghanistan has reaped the whirlwind. But they will not stop, especially not the Pakistani security establishment as it still looks for a hand to play in the endgame in Afghanistan.

Sadly, for the mothers whose children were abducted by the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur or bombed in Peshawar on their way to school, or the Afghan and Pakistani soldiers and policemen being targeted on a daily basis by the Haqqani terrorist network, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura and their bloodthirsty underlings, every day is an end — literally the end of the world — and not merely an endgame. My heart goes out to every Afghan and Pakistani individual and family that has suffered at the hands of the religious zealots not just in the last two weeks but since the modern-day hostilities were unleashed on Afghanistan.

Two generations of Afghans and Pakistanis have been lost to the latter’s misadventure in Afghanistan — the little Great Game that it has sought to play, as the successor to the British, for over four decades now. The Pakistani security establishment would have the current generation believe that everything was hunky-dory as far as Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan went, before the Soviet bear and then the big bad American wolves descended on Afghanistan and therefore if somehow the status quo ante was restored, things will be back to that imaginary normal again. Neither did the Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan start with the arrival of the Soviets nor are its designs on Afghanistan about to vaporise with the departure of the US, which it badly craves.

It is pertinent to remind readers that Pakistan and Afghanistan first recalled their ambassadors after breakdown in diplomatic relations in the aftermath of the Indo-Chinese war of 1961-62. The setting up of the Frontier Regions and Tribal Affairs ministry, headed by Major General (retired) Jamaldar Khan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s was not a result of the US presence in Afghanistan. President Daud Khan responded by creating a similar ministry in Afghanistan. It was around the same time that Pakistan took in the very first batch of Islamist militants like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Maulvi Nabi Muhammadi and put them under the patronage of Major-General Naseerullah Babar in Peshawar. General Babar was to later take pride in creating the present-day Taliban and affectionately called them his ‘boys’!

One welcomes that Ambassador Humayun Khan and national security analyst Ms Nasim Zehra, who were part of a recent exercise by the Islamabad-based Jinnah Institute (JI) and United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, DC resulting in the report titled ‘Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite’, have come forward to debate the merits and demerits of the whole process. In her two-part op-ed contribution to this paper, Ms Zehra notes:

“Criticism on the actual points made in the report is necessary. A genuine debate on a crucial policy issue is urgently needed. The critics must contest with the participants’ perception of how the current policy-makers are evaluating the challenge and their options. The issue of what the policy must be has still to be addressed” (‘All power to informed debate but... — II’, Daily Times, September 14, 2011).

I say to Ms Zehra that this indeed is the spirit. I thank her and I thank the Editor of Daily Times for affording Ms Zehra the space to candidly put forth her point of view. In the same spirit it would be highly desirous that Ms Zehra, who anchors a television programme on (political) policy matters now invites and hears out the critics of the JI-USIP report just like she gave space to Ms Sherry Rehman of the JI and Mr Moeed Yusuf of USIP. The debate must not end in the pages of the English press only. Regardless of whether the report represented the views of the so-called foreign policy elite, the debate ought to be elevated now both to the target audience at the highest possible level as well as opened up to the common man and woman to participate, not just in Pakistan but in Afghanistan, the US and also India.

The first sentence of the JI-USIP report states: “the importance of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and as a US partner in South Asia is indisputable”. Will and Ariel Durant had noted in The Story of Civilisation that ‘inquiry is fatal to certainty’. But, the opposite is also true. Nothing kills inquiry and scientific method like prejudicial certitude. This holds for both natural and social sciences whether it is a review, report, research, analysis or meta-analysis. We must, therefore, focus on the critical analysis of this report and what it purports to bring to the table.

(To be continued)

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki

COMMENT: Our mythical Afghan endgame —Shahid Ilyas

2011-09-11T22:19:00.001-07:00

If internal security challenges indeed entail such endgames, then how about contemplating an endgame for Pakistan itself? Should we not think about a political set up in Islamabad that gives a share in power to groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba?

“The endgame in Afghanistan” is a favourite phrase these days of the Pakistani media, politicians, think tanks and, of course, the military. Nowhere else in the world do people talk about this, because there is no such thing in the offing. This is typical Pakistani daydreaming.

We in Pakistan wish that the world ends its ‘game’ and we get the field free for us to play in accordance with our own designs. We are so badly blinded by our obsession with our policy of ‘strategic depth’ that we simply cannot see, nor comprehend, the significance of the things that have happened in Afghanistan in the last 10 years. We fail to see that international troops have been deployed in Afghanistan following a global compact — under the auspices of the UN — for stabilising Afghanistan.

Let us take a cursory look at the Afghanistan of today. The country now has a legal framework according to which the state is run. Constitutional bodies, including the president, judiciary and parliament, are functioning. The country has a standing army of nearly 200,000 men and women (and counting), armed with modern weapons. Here, it is important to note that, contrary to some hostile propaganda, Pashtuns constitute more than 40 percent of the Afghan army. It has a police force with a presence in all parts of the country. All the cities and towns are connected to each other through a network of roads, which were built in the last decade (since 2001) thanks to the commitment of the international community. Schools and hospitals have been built in every nook and corner of the country. Provincial and district governments are functional in all parts of Afghanistan. All this shows that Afghanistan is as good, or bad, as any other underdeveloped country, including Pakistan.

More importantly, international forces are not going to leave until the end of 2014. And when they do ‘leave’, it is not going to be an all-out exodus. Many will stay to see that the Afghanistan that they have built with their extraordinary investment of blood and money does not fall back into chaos. We can well imagine the numbers of Afghan forces and their increased fighting and law-enforcement capacity by the end of 2014, and beyond.

Another very significant factor to keep in mind while talking about the mythical endgame, is the ongoing series of negotiations between the US and Afghan governments for a long lasting treaty of strategic partnership. This treaty will include, naturally, US internal and external security guarantees to Afghanistan. The treaty is supposed to include provisions of continued US supply of weapons and training to Afghan security forces. Moreover, the treaty is likely to make Afghanistan the recipient of continued large-scale economic assistance.

The Pakistani theorists of the so-called endgame base their argument on security challenges that the Afghans face from Taliban groups and an eventual hand over of government to the latter. But, if internal security challenges indeed entail such endgames, then how about contemplating an endgame for Pakistan itself? There are a host of groups in the Islamic Republic that are fighting against the Pakistani state. They operate with impunity in all parts of the country and aim to take over the state. Therefore, should we not be worrying about our own endgame? Should we not think about a political set up in Islamabad that gives a share in power to groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)?

Afghanistan today — although facing many challenges — is better off in every respect than it ever was. Its robust media, activist civil society, universities, a dynamic entrepreneur class and democratic institutions are thriving and taking root. Its leaders in every field are far more advanced and sophisticated than their predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s. They obtained extensive exposure during their flight from their country in the 1980s. They acquired higher education in good institutions of learning around the world and now many of them are back home. They are applying their skills in various fields of Afghan life for the uplift of their country.

Therefore, we can rest assured that there is not going to be any endgame in Afghanistan with a potential for opening doors for Pakistani games. If there is any, it is the endgame of Pakistan’s policy of strategic depth. The Pakistani media, politicians and generals need to focus on the games in the Islamic Republic. They need to worry about the raging civil wars in Karachi, Balochistan and FATA, its dwindling economy, its painful energy shortages, its poor who kill themselves and their children out of fear of starvation and so on and so forth.

The only major challenge that Afghanistan faces today and is likely to have to live with for the foreseeable future is that of an unstable Pakistan on its frontiers. With a bankrupt economy, corrupt institutions, rising militancy and the failure of the state to maintain its writ in substantial swathes of its geography, Pakistan is going to remain a challenge for its neighbours and the world at large. What is going to be the endgame in the Islamic Republic?

Afterthought: if by endgame we mean militants accepting Afghan law and joining Afghan society, that is to be welcomed and is what the Afghan government and the West seek. If that is called endgame, the Pakistani establishment does not have to be enthusiastic about it because it does in no way offer it any opportunity to play its game of strategic depth in Afghanistan. But if by it we mean the establishment of a pan-Islamist entity in Kabul ala the 1990s, that is not going to happen. On that I can bet!

The writer hails from Waziristan and can be reached at ilyasakbarkhan@gmail.com

ANALYSIS: Liberal face of religious bigotry —Farhat Taj

2011-09-05T15:48:00.001-07:00

The report is aimed at justifying the establishment’s long-standing Afghan policy, the strategic depth policy that has brought nothing but destruction to the Pakhtun and has created religious bigotry in Pakistan

Recently, the Sherry Rehman-led Jinnah Institute in Pakistan and the US Institute for Peace (USIP) launched a report called ‘Pakistan, the United States and the Endgame in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite’. The report documents the views of a select group of Pakistani foreign policy ‘elite’ on the so-called Afghanistan endgame/future power structure in Afghanistan. The report has been given a great deal of coverage in the Pakistani media by some of the ‘elite’ who participated in discussions leading to the report.

The report is misleading and marred by selection as well as projection biases. It is prejudiced against the Pakhtun in Pakistan and Afghanistan and reflects the view of a narrow vested interest in Pakistan that has been engaged in the genocide of the Pakhtun for three decades. I will elaborate these issues in my critical analysis of this report to be published in a research journal. In this column, I will only comment on the report’s so-called ‘foreign policy elite’ of Pakistan and the views of this elite.

The overwhelming majority of the elite who participated in discussions and interviews for the report, includes people who are linked with the military establishment of Pakistan and have a track record of producing and promoting outright lies or distorted information about the Pakhtun in the media and research in line with the military establishment’s strategic depth policy in Afghanistan. As a mark of tokenism, the Jinnah Institute included a tribal journalist in the elite without paying any attention to the fact whether or not a tribal journalist could freely express himself with a group of people so closely linked with the same establishment that has imposed death and destruction on his tribal homeland — all those tribal journalists who have dared to expose the state terror in FATA have been killed. A representative of the Pakhtun nationalist ANP has been interviewed, but it seems his views have been thoroughly censored: there is nothing in the report that concurs with the ANP stance about the future set up in Afghanistan, especially in terms of the terror sanctuaries implanted in FATA by the military establishment and their role in the future Afghan set up.

It is thus no wonder that this elite presents the Pakhtun and the Taliban as a synonym and argues for the accommodation in the future Afghan government set up of those fringe elements of the wider Pakhtun society, the Haqqani Taliban and Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura, all of which are hardly anything more than proxies of the military establishment of Pakistan. Basically, the report is aimed at justifying the establishment’s long-standing Afghan policy, the strategic depth policy that has brought nothing but destruction to the Pakhtun and has created religious bigotry in Pakistan. The elite is using the notion of the ‘not antagonistic to Pakistan’ government in Afghanistan to camouflage the notion of strategic depth in Afghanistan. They are using the name of the Pakhtun nation to camouflage the Taliban terrorists. The report is basically a ‘liberal’ cover-up of an essentially fundamentalist policy of the Pakistani state. Since the elite do not want to repeatedly talk of empowering the Taliban — this is not correct political discourse in the post 9/11 world — so they talk of including the ‘Pakhtun’ in the Afghan power structure. It unmistakably looks as if the elite is implying that the Taliban are representative of the Pakhtun. It is stunning to compare the elite’s insistence of Pakhtun inclusion in the future Afghan power structure — as if they care so much for the political concerns of the Pakhtun population — and their devil may care attitude towards the Pakistani establishment-inflicted state crimes against the tribes in the Af-Pak region in which they suffer every single day.

The elite’s whole notion is misleading. The question therefore is: can there be a Taliban without Talibanisation, especially when they emerge from the conflict as ‘victors’? What about the thousands of Pakhtun killed by the Taliban? Their communities want the Taliban to meet justice and the Pakistani elite is adamant to see them ruling the Pakhtun? The views of the elite also look like an invitation to other countries of this region to provide, just like Pakistan, terror sanctuaries to Afghan militants in order to be taken seriously by the US in the endgame in Afghanistan. Do the elite care that the people in Afghanistan, both Pakhtun and others, might interpret their views as Pakistani hegemony over their country? Could the Pakistani elite become any more bankrupt, morally and intellectually?

There is nothing in the report that the world never knew about already. The only difference is that, before, the elite used to express such anti-Pakhtun, pro- establishment-and-Taliban views separately and now their voices have been assembled in one report. It is unfortunate that the USIP, which is said to have supported the work for the report, might have used the US taxpayers’ money for this report. What is in this report that the US policy makers and think tanks were unaware of? There could have been much better use of this money.

The saddest part of the report is that Sherry Rehman, the liberal face of Pakistan, has undertaken an exercise that provided a ‘liberal mask’ to the essentially anti-people totalitarian policy of strategic depth rooted in religious bigotry and state terrorism. This was unexpected of her given her secular and pro-people democratic track record. This is a win for the security establishment and a setback for the pro-democracy forces in Pakistan.

As far as the Haqqani Taliban and Quetta Shura are concerned, the Americans are welcome to eliminate them with their drone strikes. The Pakhtun will not shed any tears for them.

The writer is the author of Taliban and Anti-Taliban

VIEW: De-radicalisation plan —Gul Bukhari

2011-08-19T18:45:00.000-07:00

It is a bitter pill to swallow, but a good start would be to recognise that, as a whole, the whole of Pakistani society is quite radicalised

One hopes the recent announcement to study a de-radicalisation plan by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) is not the latest in the never-ending series of jokes perpetrated on the Pakistani people by its rulers — but it does sound like one.

By the sounds of the focus of the DCC meeting, the scope of their de-radicalisation plan may turn out to be too narrow, and therefore ineffectual. Thus timely input from the wider society would be highly valuable. The press statement from the committee that “it was decided in the committee that special attention shall be given to a de-radicalisation programme to motivate youth to engage and isolate them from militancy and terrorism and bring them back to peaceful living” indicates a very specific goal of trying to revert militant youth to normality.

The “need to clearly identify the threat posed by terrorism, including the underlying factors such as ideological, motivational, funding, weapon supply, training and organisational support for terrorist groups and those aiding and abetting the terrorists” is also all very well in terms of anti-militancy, but not de-radicalisation.

The country needs a genuine de-radicalisation effort, with an outreach well beyond an attempt at treating or curing a few hundred radicalised militant boys. The focus of the DCC’s de-radicalisation programme, however, appears far from such a strategy with its references to expanding the army’s admittedly commendable pilot project in Swat to de-radicalise ex-militants.

This problem needs to be viewed from outside just the security paradigm. Security related issues like terrorism surface only at the last and fatal stage of radicalisation and it will not do to remain in denial about all the other stages that lead up to it. It appears the government is speaking of ‘de-radicalisation’ but ‘means’ only an anti-militancy drive with its focus on weapons, coordination between security agencies, and ideologies, etc.

If the fundamentally important fact that militant movements recruit mostly an already radicalised people is recognised, it would become easy to formulate a comprehensive strategy that de-couples anti-militancy from de-radicalisation.

It is a bitter pill to swallow, but a good start would be to recognise that, as a whole, the whole of Pakistani society is quite radicalised and very basic attitude changes are in order to achieve a more gentle society at peace with itself, and therefore less likely to become fodder in the hands of militancy.

I can substantiate this claim with anecdotes ranging from the most minor to the very major. At the supposedly trivial end, I know that I live in a radicalised society when highly educated friends endorse my two-meals-a-day dieting efforts, not with scientific research or proof but with Ahadees and Sunnah, “Haan, patta hai, aan Hazrat (SAW) ney bhi yehi kaha tha” (yes, you know, the Prophet Mohammed [PBUH] also said so).

I do not think I need to cite examples at the more serious end of the spectrum to illustrate my point. What, however, needs to be pointed out here is some of the measures needed to be taken to deal with those. It would be ideal, though, that a national commission is formulated for the purpose, as the radicalised state of our society is no less than an existential threat.

The first and foremost, and clichéd, measure is to bring back the rule of law to at least the settled areas of Pakistan. No new laws are required. Existing laws need to be implemented to bring Mumtaz Qadri, murderer of deceased Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer, for example, to justice. His case has to be the epitome of open-and-shut cases, does it not? Letting his case languish, and speaking of de-radicalisation measures, strategies and big words makes a mockery of the whole idea.

Similar is the case of Malik Ishaq of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, indicted in 44 cases in which 70 people were killed. Slowly, over time, witnesses in the different cases against him have been murdered, with the last remaining ones in fear of their lives. So rule of law, then, leads us to witness and judge protection programmes. These need to be strengthened.

Hate speech pundits, who are many times the source, unlike the vessels who commit the physical crime, should now become a serious subject of scrutiny. Many of them often belong to the media itself, a factor that ought not to be allowed to obfuscate and facilitate criminal misuse of principles of free speech. The names of Sufi Mohammed of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), Amir Liaquat, Meher Bukhari, Mubashir Luqman, all popular talk show hosts, and Zaid Hamid, a self-styled security analyst, to name only a very, very few, simply leap to mind. We have laws on our statute books that address the very nature of radicalising hate crimes they commit with impunity on a daily basis. Implementation of these laws would be another good start.

To hastily touch upon a couple of other areas (fairly vast subjects having been written about by many critics already), the revision and re-evaluation of national curriculum text books taught to children should be another facet of the de-radicalisation of society.

Most important of all, and one cannot do justice to it here in a few words, are the various articles of the constitution and ordinances that promote intolerance in society. These need to be taken a vicious knife to to rid society of its lego-moral sanction to vigilantism. Think of the boy gunned down for smoking before iftaar during Ramzan. Think of federal ministers speaking of murdering with their own hands anyone committing blasphemy.

The writer is a journalist and can be reached at gulnbukhari@gmail.com. She tweets at http://twitter.com/gulbukhari

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\08\20\story_20-8-2011_pg3_2

ANALYSIS: New FATA reforms — good but insufficient —Farhat Taj

2011-08-19T18:43:00.001-07:00

ANALYSIS: New FATA reforms — good but insufficient —Farhat Taj

All over FATA, development projects have been contracted to the Taliban or people close to the Taliban in the last decade or so. This has been part of the security establishment’s policy to nurture and strengthen the militants’ control over tribal society

Recently, the president of Pakistan signed two orders whereby the Political Parties Order 2002 was extended to FATA and some changes were introduced in the British-legislated Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) that have been governing FATA since 1901. The people of FATA can now participate in political activities inside FATA and all political parties of Pakistan can legally operate in the area. The changes in the FCR accorded limited human rights to the tribal people. No one can be indefinitely detained and people will have a right to appeal in the FCR tribunal. Cases will be decided in a fixed timeframe and arrested people can be released on bail. Women, children below the age of 16 and elders above the age of 65 will no longer be subject to the collective punishment provisions process. No person in FATA can now be deprived of their property without being provided compensation. The political agents’ use of state funds will now be subjected to audit by the auditor general of Pakistan.

The newly legislated reforms can and should be seen as the first step towards legal, political and socio-economic development in FATA. The PPP-led coalition government deserves credit for taking this much needed first step. But, nevertheless, the reforms are insufficient. Also, there are practical hurdles in the implementation of these reforms that only the government can remove. One would, therefore, like this government to be more assertive and courageous in dealing with FATA on legal as well as security issues.

A recent report by Amnesty International declared FATA as a “human rights-free zone” in Pakistan. The area remains a human rightsifree zone to a larger extent despite the recent reforms. The archaic and draconian collective responsibility law is not totally done away with in the new reforms. This is an affront to the established human rights in the constitution of Pakistan as well as international human rights instruments. Also, the reforms do not concur with one of the key principles of human rights: separation of the judiciary and the executive. The FCR Tribunal, the appellate authority where FATA residents can appeal against decisions, has no judge and is staffed by bureaucrats alone.

The biggest hurdle is the presence of the terror sanctuaries in the area. The sanctuaries contain the ‘strategic assets’ of the security establishment of Pakistan. These sanctuaries have to be destroyed before the people of FATA can benefit from the reforms. This implies that the policy of strategic depth has to be given up. There is no sign that this has happened. The PPP government has no control over the security policy that entails the abuse of FATA as a base for terrorism and has thus far shown no sign that it has the will to confront the powerful generals to release FATA from the military-militant occupation. With the terror sanctuaries in the area, only the pro-Taliban religious political parties that already dominate the politics of the region through mosques and mullahs supported by the local political administration will benefit from the extension of the Political Parties Act. Anti-terror political parties, like the ANP, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party and PPP, will not be able to freely operate in the area. The political will of the tribal people will remain under siege of terror and the people may have to withdraw from the political process or align themselves with the religious parties as a means to escape the deadly anger of the Taliban and the state security apparatus behind them. Thus, while theoretically the extension of the Political Parties Order is a giant step forward, practically it would take no less than the total shift in the military-controlled security policy regarding Afghanistan to make terror-free political participation for the tribal people an attainable civil rights entitlement.

Moreover, all over FATA, development projects have been contracted to the Taliban or people close to the Taliban in the last decade or so. This has been part of the security establishment’s policy to nurture and strengthen the militants’ control over tribal society. This is linked with the security policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Will the auditor general of Pakistan, who is authorised to audit the political administration’s utilisation of funds, be able to put an end to the contracting of development projects to the Taliban or people close to them? This again seems unlikely without a shift in the security paradigm of Pakistan.

No modern state, including Pakistan, can have any justification whatsoever in terms of the international human rights treaties to subjugate a section of its population to laws like the FCR. The system worked for British colonial interests and so it presented it to the world as being the wish of the tribal people. It also worked well for the jihadi misadventures of the Pakistani state since the 1948 Kashmir war and so it preserved the system. The will of the tribal people has never been taken into consideration by both states, the British and Pakistani. From the tribal people’s perspective, the FCR has always meant ‘regulation of state crimes against their innocent people’ and, since 9/11, it implies the ‘regulation of state terrorism against the innocent people’. Seen in this context, the recent legal reforms hardly seem anything more than cosmetic measures. For a real change of affairs in FATA, the FCR must be totally abolished, for which there is a consensus in the area, the region must be fully integrated in the legal framework of Pakistan and the state security paradigm should shift.

The writer is the author of Taliban and Anti-Taliban

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\08\20\story_20-8-2011_pg3_5

ANALYSIS: The great equaliser: death by 140 characters —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-08-18T16:25:00.000-07:00

Taqi

The man, who claims to be imbued with love for Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), is seen and heard uttering profanities while getting ready to recite and explain one of the most revered eulogies (qaseedah) of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). But that is not it. The ‘humanist’ seemed to be making light of a hypothetical question from a caller asking if suicide is permissible for a woman in imminent danger of rape

“You don’t own the eyeballs. You don’t own the press, which is now divided into pro and amateur zones. You don’t control production on the new platform, which isn’t one-way. There’s a new balance of power between you and us” — ‘The People Formerly Known as the Audience’, Professor Jay Rosen.

The traditional media has had the power to bring down the powerful with a single story, picture, sound byte or a video clip. And it has done so with great impunity. The media barons have acted like gods and media personalities have wielded power over lesser mortals without the fear of being confronted or called out on what they have peddled as the gospel truth.

In the post-judiciary movement in Pakistan, the media, especially the electronic media, has often acted like a rogue — intoxicated with its newly acquired might — ready to stomp on anything that did not conform to its whims. In a country over which the military and the mullahs have held sway, hand in glove with each other, for the better part of its existence, the establishment kept its foot in the door by launching two upgraded media weapons in the era of General Pervez Musharraf’s so-called enlightened moderation.

One was a breed of opinion writers, featuring predominantly in the English press, who, masquerading as ‘liberals,’ sold the Pakistani security establishment’s party line to the urban middle class youth that had already been softened through a barrage of chauvinism via the state-controlled textbooks inherited from the Ziaul Haq era. While similar propaganda materials appearing in the vernacular press were quite blatant and thus easy to spot, these ‘liberals’ were more subtle and it took a slight effort to figure out that despite their inflection and jargon, they operated within the confines of the establishment’s ideological framework.

The second line of characters were the televangelists — some brandishing their born-again credentials — who were lobbed into urban middle class living rooms, where the traditional preacher had thus far failed to make significant headway. These charlatans, clad in gaudy ‘designer’ shalwar kameez (traditional shirt and trousers), were marketed as religious scholars without anyone ever questioning their qualifications. Just as English language and a western diploma, ostensibly, were a sufficient measure of liberalism, a beard and a quasi-Arabic accent were considered enough to certify clerical bona fides. The media houses allowed these imposters to opine not just on simple topics but gave them carte blanche to issue edicts on matters literally of life and death.

I had lamented in these pages that “in countries like Pakistan, with a history of fairly robust political movements, the failure of opinion leaders to use the social media to harness the power of these conduits to firm up an alternative political discourse is rather disappointing” (‘Social media’s potential: breakups to breakthroughs’, Daily Times, June 9, 2011). I must submit that I stand corrected. But not by the opinion leaders or those described as established writers: it is the people formerly known as the audience who have brought down the traditional media Goliaths.

Several news reports and articles have appeared in the contemporary press that were a lazy piece of reporting or opinion writing and, to say the least, presented the vulnerable communities in a dangerously distasteful manner. But before any ‘established’ writer could or would respond to these pieces, the Gullivers had been tied down by the Lilliputians — and I use the term as a compliment — of the blogging and micro-blogging world. Thread by thread or in this case, tweet by tweet and blog post by blog post, the behemoths were pinned down, exposed and their flawed and odious narrative deconstructed. In the rejoinder pieces to these ‘bucking bloggers’, the Gullivers seemed stuttering, subdued and in retreat. The contemporary (new) media had successfully prised open the traditional media’s grip on the gospel truth.

This past weekend, a YouTube video of a self-declared religious scholar (Dr Aamir Liaquat Hussain) went viral over the contemporary media. The gentleman is not a nonentity — at least not to himself. His own website introduces him as “truly a legend of this modern age. A man of many qualities, prominent scholar who possesses a pleasing disposition, veteran journalist whose name becomes synonymous with truthfulness and bravery in the field of journalism, prolific columnist whose articles inspire his readers, a famous Naat Khawan whom Allah Almighty gifted a melodious voice. But above all he is a learned person and a true lover of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and even his adversaries acknowledged this fact...he raised his voice against those who violated humanistic values...he exposed double standards of this Hippocratic [sic] society.”

If the montage of clips, apparently put together from the ‘dailies’ (raw footage of a programme or film) recorded before, during and after his assorted religious programmes, is authentic, this ‘true legend of the modern age’ has been taking millions of viewers for a ride via the traditional tele-media. The man, who claims to be imbued with love for Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), is seen and heard uttering profanities while getting ready to recite and explain one of the most revered eulogies (qaseedah) of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). But that is not it. The ‘humanist’ seemed to be making light of a hypothetical question from a caller asking if suicide is permissible for a woman in imminent danger of rape. The irony reminded one of Hafiz Shirazi’s verse:

“Wa’izaan k’een jalwa der mehrab-o-mimber mikunand,

Choon ba khilwat mirawand aan kaar e deegar mikunand.”

(The religious preachers who show their glory on the pulpit under the arch of the mosque,

Indulge in different things when they retire to their privacy — translation by Ali Sardar Jafri.)

The said televangelist, speaking on his current television show, has since impugned the authenticity of the video and has claimed that the clip had been fabricated by way of editing and dubbing to malign him by other channels and jealous people. Maybe so. Moreover, in biometrics, voice authentication is already an established tool, along the lines of fingerprinting, available to forensic scientists to confirm identity.

The video was removed from YouTube due to a copyrights claim. But before that many users of contemporary media had reportedly downloaded it already. The new balance of power is apparently still lost on the media honchos giving space and airtime to hypocrisy, lies and slanted truths. Death by a thousand cuts has decimated superpowers. If they do not heed the audience, death by 140 characters (on Twitter) is the equaliser that could seal the fate of the traditional media dinosaurs running the show.

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\08\18\story_18-8-2011_pg3_2

VIEW: The real ghost —Gulmina Bilal Ahmad

2011-08-18T16:22:00.000-07:00

The arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan was shocking for the public because no one could ever suspect a serving army officer, particularly of Brigadier rank, to be a part of an organisation that is banned and allegedly shares the mindset of al Qaeda and other like-minded organisations

I am reminded of a dear friend‘s remark about Pakistan as I roam the cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Commenting on Pakistan, he said, “Who says we do not enjoy freedom in Pakistan? You can pee on the streets and no one is going to touch you.” Same is the case with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

HT is a banned group. It is a terrorist organisation; a terrorist organisation that undoubtedly invests a lot of money in corporate branding to mention just one characteristic. The twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad are full of the expensively printed orange and black posters of HT. For me it is akin to urinating on the streets such are their ideas of misplaced Islamism but then what do I know? I am but a “decadent follower of western thought” as one HT supporter so eloquently referred to me in an e-mail a few weeks back.

This particular poster calls upon the “real Muslims in the Pakistan Army” to stand up and fight against the “American-funded, nefarious designs against Islam”. The particular “nefarious design” is the arrest of their deputy spokesperson, Mr Imran Yousafzai, against which all of us but particularly the “real Muslims in the Pakistan Army” need to unite against. General Kayani might ad nauseam declare that “there can only be one cult in the army and that is the army itself” but HT begs to differ. HT is entitled to their own opinions, but may I ask how is it that the banned HT can operate freely and put up posters in public places? Previously in this space I have shared approximations of the fee that the Rawalpindi Development Authority (RDA) and the Capital Development Authority (CDA) take as taxable fee per day to put up signs and banners, etc. I will spare you dear reader, the crude financial calculations but will not refrain from boring you with repeating my question: how is this done? Why is HT given the space to put up their posters? Who all are supporting such banned organisations?

HT was allowed to operate in Pakistan during the reign of General Pervez Musharraf in 2003. It is an organisation that is slowly but very effectively gaining support in Pakistan. Its origin can be traced back to Jerusalem and it came in the limelight when it started its operations in the UK during the 80s. The organisation claims to be non-violent and is struggling for the establishment of Khilafat (Caliphate) across the globe. Its operations were banned in 2004, alleging its involvement in anti-state and violent activities.

Recently, a Brigadier named Ali Khan was arrested, allegedly for having links with HT. Following his arrest, four unknown military officers serving as Majors were also arrested. Right after the arrests were made, the second in command, deputy spokesperson of HT in Pakistan, Imran Yousafzai, was also arrested, who according to his associates, was going to meet a local journalist. According to media reports, a few other arrests were also carried out in connection with the involvement of these persons with the banned organisation.

Islamabad, being the capital of the country, supposedly has better security measures compared to the rest of the country. The intelligence services and police are said to be equally active around the capital. However, these claims are nullified by the presence of posters, banners and flyers of HT found across the capital, without the exception of the red-zone sectors. Anyone can spot the orange coloured posters, portraying the stance of this organisation, which is primarily anti-democratic, supporting the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate across the globe. The amount of money being spent on the publishing and dissemination of the posters, banners and flyers, etc, also gives rise to suspicions about the source of their funding.

The arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan was shocking for the public because no one could ever suspect a serving army officer, particularly of Brigadier rank, to be a part of an organisation that is banned and allegedly shares the mindset of al Qaeda and other like-minded organisations. These arrests also point towards the extent to which this organisation has penetrated our armed forces.

HT is also said to be active in Egypt and, according to some analysts, had a central role in the revolution. It had also developed its links within the armed forces of Egypt, which paved the way for the revolution.

This organisation is hoping for an Arab Spring in Pakistan; something similar to the revolutions of the Arab world. However, it seems that the arrest of their deputy spokesperson in Pakistan has given them a setback, which is quite evident from their latest poster that could also be seen at different places across Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

The latest poster warns the government and particularly the armed forces that they should stop following the dictates of the US. It is clearly written that those who show fidelity to the US are enemies of Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah. Then the poster describes that their deputy spokesperson has been lifted by the intelligence agencies, which is a cowardly act and these measures will not stop the organisation from going further.

Pakistan is already flooded by the presence of trusts and charities that are actually militant organisations in disguise. HT presents danger of a new kind because it does not work on the pattern of these trusts and charities but targets the educated class in society. This in a way is more dangerous than bombs because losing educated people to these organisations will seriously damage the efforts of those who are trying their best for the country to survive.

The security establishment must come up with a through plan to dismantle all the organisations and non-state actors that are trying to destabilise the country. HT, although non-violent, presents a serious danger to the country and its armed forces. It is time that a serious crackdown should be initiated and these organisations be completely removed from the country, so that their message remains undelivered. We are certainly not the UK, which has still not banned the organisation, terming it non-violent and not against UK laws. We certainly cannot afford the existence of these organisations when we are already dealing with the menace of terrorism in the country.

On August 17, we marked another year of the death of General Ziaul Haq (may he not rest in peace). As I examine the impunity with which HT is operating, why is a single thought consuming me : Zia is dead but his ghost is larger than all of us.

The writer is a freelance consultant. She can be reached at coordinator@individualland.com

source;

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\08\19\story_19-8-2011_pg3_2

ANALYSIS: We defeated the USSR, so shall we the US — Pakistan - Shahid Ilyas

2011-08-15T18:15:00.000-07:00

We have never let the Afghans focus on building their state and realise their dreams of economic prosperity. And we continue to do so even today. Do we expect exotic Afghan rugs from Kabul in return?

In response to a piece in this paper titled ‘Is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan going to disintegrate?’ (Daily Times, July 30, 2011), this author received many e-mails. Many of them were threatening and abusive. All the abusive ones had one thing in common. They claimed that I was certainly an American agent and received American dollars. One wishes one were that lucky! One fellow stated, “I want to discourage you from this (writing) profession.” I am sure this gentle fellow would have instantly declared me as one of the best brains this republic ever produced had I done the popular hatemongering against Afghanistan, the US, India and Israel.

The Islamic Republic seems to suffer from terminal paranoia given the kind of narratives most of its people are made to believe in, nay, made to kill and die for. What exactly did I say that had these friends of mine frothing at the mouth? I quote one excerpt from the column in question: “The republic is currently represented by a few Punjabi generals, religious fundamentalists, feudal lords and Syeds. This clique has to decide between two options. Either the Islamic Republic is allowed to disintegrate, or it has to fashion itself according to its ground realities.”

One fails to understand how one becomes an American agent by pleading with the generals, syedo-feudals and religious fundamentalists to have mercy on Pakistan. If the US indeed shares this view with the people of Pakistan, there could be no better friends. But one has doubts, for this rotten system has partially survived thus far courtesy the inflow of American dollars and military hardware.

The fact of the matter is that, starting from its inception, the Islamic Republic would have gone bankrupt many times over had it not been for the inflow of American dollars and military hardware. This applies even now. And yet we (by ‘we’ I mean the establishment and its consumers of brainwashing in the middle and upper-middle classes) are one of the most — probably ‘the’ most — anti-American countries on planet Earth! And this nonsensical anti-Americanism has brought the Islamic Republic to the verge of collapse. People’s energies are wasted on poisonous narratives rather than on positive things.

How unfortunate are we to have a country whose existence our policy makers believe depends on the perpetuation of conflicts, silencing of dissent, torture, human rights violations and hatemongering. Minus hatred, torture, turmoil and conflict, the republic is believed to have nothing that can keep it together. More than 60 years of its existence have been wasted. Had our leaders — military and civilians — built a stable economy and strong democratic institutions, the populace would have had this as an incentive to stand united and not let it disintegrate. Our leaders would not have depended on hatemongering and conflicts for the country’s unity.

The ‘educated’ middle and upper-middle classes — exceptions apart — whose rage shoots up at the mention of Afghanistan, the US, Israel and India, cannot put forward a single good reason for their ideology of hate. Their only reason, if at all it can be elevated to the status of reason for the sake of debate, is that these countries are secretly working towards dividing Pakistan. One wishes they had enough wit to move a step further and think with a cold mind as to why they would want to divide the Islamic Republic.

This paranoia is the consequence of the wrong foreign policy of the Islamic Republic over the past 60 years. It believes that if Pakistan-based groups (Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and company) can work for the disintegration of India, the latter cannot be expected to have goodwill for the Islamic Republic. One hopes we do not forget the mayhem in Mumbai involving Ajmal Kasab and his links to our republic. This is just one example from hundreds in which the Islamic Republic has demonstrated its intention to bleed India. Do we expect baskets of mangos from India in return? We must be kidding!

Afghanistan has been bled by our republic for a very long time. We have never let the Afghans focus on building their state and realise their dreams of economic prosperity. And we continue to do so even today. Do we expect exotic Afghan rugs from Kabul in return?

We are probably the only country to have declared our enmity to Israel. Let us forget about Iran because we are not Iran. To this day, the Pakistani passport can take you everywhere (in theory) except Israel. Our so-called ghairat brigade nurtures more hatred against Israel than HAMAS does. And we know who pulls the strings of this brigade. Do we expect the arrival of financial experts from Israel to correct our bankrupt economy?

Our most unreasonable hatred is our hatred of the US. We apply the logic, which says, “The friend of my enemy is my enemy.” The US, being a friend of Afghanistan, India and Israel — our perceived enemies — is our enemy. Therefore, rather than adjusting ourselves to the chessboard of global politics, we are vainly involved in a struggle to change the rules of chess. We want the world to play according to our rules. Our rules are the following:

1) The world should leave Afghanistan and hand it over to us. Thanks ‘strategic depth’!

2) The US should denounce its friendship with India and Israel.

3) We should be allowed everything we want from India. We want Srinagar and Delhi if possible!

4) The world should continue giving us dollars, or else we will commit suicide attacks with nuclear jackets around our waist, thus destroying ourselves and all others around us.

None of our demands are going to be entertained. These are dreams. And one wishes dreams could help realities. We either have to be powerful enough to force the world into accepting our demands (dreams), or we have to play global chess according to international rules. Since 1947, we have mindlessly striven to force our rules down the throat of the world. The end result is talk about the prospects of the disintegration of the Islamic Republic. It actually disintegrated once. Please stop hatemongering and try to put your house in order. I promise, the world will be helping.

Postscript: The preposterous belief of our policymakers that we defeated one superpower (the USSR) and we will defeat the remaining one has to be changed. This is going to sink the remaining part of the Islamic Republic.

The writer belongs to Waziristan and can be reached at ilyasakbarkhan@gmail.com

ANP commemorates Babhara Martyrs Day

2011-08-12T21:12:00.000-07:00

Tauseef-ur-Rahman
Saturday, August 13, 2011

PESHAWAR: The Awami National Party (ANP) on Friday commemorated Babhara Martyrs Day and paid rich tributes to those who laid down their lives for the Pakhtun rights on August 12, 1948.

The party organised Quran Khwani at the Bacha Khan Markaz, the party’s central secretariat, in Peshawar. Provincial leaders and a large number of party workers attended the event.

A ceremony was also held at Babhara village in Charsadda district where Senior Minister and ANP leader Bashir Bilour, adviser to chief minister Mukhtiar Khan, district organizer Khalid Khan, Chairman district development committee Qasim Khan and party workers placed floral wreaths on the monuments to the people slain in the firing incident.

Addressing the party workers, Bashir Bilour lauded the sacrifices of hundreds of Pakhtuns who were unarmed and were demanding release of their leaders arrested by the then provincial government led by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan.

Attributing the recent achievements of the party to Babhara martyrs, Bashir Bilour said the ANP followed in the footsteps of the elders who struggled for the rights of the Pakhtun people. He termed the killing of Pakhtuns at Babhara a black chapter of Pakistan’s history, adding that the Pakhtun people would always condemn the incident. He said history was witness to the fact that ANP always strived for Pakhtuns’ rights through peaceful means and rendered many sacrifices for the cause.

He said due to acts of terrorism the Pakhtuns were faced with an undeclared world war in their land. “The price paid by Pakhtuns in recent war on terror will bear fruit and peace will be restored. The achievements of ANP in the last three years will usher in an era of progress and prosperity,” he stressed.

The ANP used to organize big public gathering on Babhara Martyrs Day. However, for last few years due to growing incidents of terrorism and attacks on the party leaders, ANP was restricted to placing floral wreath and organizing a symbolic gathering in Babhara village.

On August 12, 1948, the security forces had opened fire on a protest rally of Khudai Khidmatgars in Babhara village, resulting in the killing of more than 602 people and injuries to thousands men and women.

Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=62642&Cat=7#.TkX4eRx1tco.facebook

Major changes made in FCR: Fata people get political rights

2011-08-12T20:13:00.000-07:00

After 64 years of Pakistan's independence, Fata people just get political rights. while still ruled by FCR, which is always considered a black law and was devised by British colonialists in 1848 as an instrument of subjugation meant to discipline the Pakhtun population and establish the writ of colonial authority. Innocent men, women and children become victims of the draconian regulations.

By Nasir Iqbal | From the Newspaper

(5 hours ago) Today

President Asif Ali Zardari signing Amendments in FCR (2011) and Extension of the Political Parties Order 2002 to the tribal areas in presence of tribal leaders, FATA parliamentarians, representatives of political parties and NGOs at the Presidency in Islamabad on Friday. – Photo by APP

ISLAMABAD: President Asif Ali Zardari signed on Friday amendments made to the century-old Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) which will give the people of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) for the first time the right of appeal against decisions of the political agent.

The president also signed the Extension of the Political Parties Order 2002 to the tribal areas where, after appropriate regulations to be framed later, political parties can operate freely and present their socio-economic programmes.

The amendments envisage setting up of a three-member Fata tribunal headed by a chairman. It will exercise the powers of revision against orders/judgments of an appellate authority having powers similar to a high court under Article 199 of the Constitution — a provision dealt with the jurisdiction of the high court.

One member of the tribunal will be a senior civil servant of not less than BPS-20 and with experience of tribal administration and the other should be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the high court though well conversant with the local Rewaj (customs).

Considered always a black law the FCR was devised by British colonialists in 1848 as an instrument of subjugation meant to discipline the Pakhtun population and establish the writ of colonial authority. Innocent men, women and children become victims of the draconian regulations. Even family members were handed a jail term for no crime of their own under the FCR.

People were sentenced to jail for the alleged crimes of their father, uncle or any of their blood relatives.

Under the FCR, the government had the powers to raze the houses of criminals and their relatives to ground as a punishment.

Extension of Political Parties Order The government believes that the permission to political parties to sell their programmes in tribal areas will counter the pernicious one-sided campaign of militants to impose their ideological agenda on the people.

Supreme Court Bar Association President Asma Jehangir welcomed the reforms and said it was a gift on the eve of Independence Day for the people of Fata as well as for the rest of the people in the country. The amendments, she said, were a big leap which would prove to be a stepping stone of further reforms.

Ms Jehangir, who had also headed the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, was confident that the jurisdiction of an ordinary high court would be extended to Fata, but said the collective punishment in every form should be abolished.

“The extension of the political parties order will also help generate the interest of people who will be gradually brought to the mainstream national life because they will enjoy the right to vote, but not to a political party. The audit of political agents will
also take care of bribe in Fata,” she said.

HRCP Director I.A. Rehman said the reforms had some nice features but were still short of expectations.

Contrary to the past practice, the amendments to the FCR provide right of bail to the accused, but it would be mandatory to produce them before the authority concerned within 24 hours of arrest.

Women, children below 16 years and men aged above 65 cannot be arrested or detained under the collective responsibility clause. Also the entire tribe will not be arrested under the clause whereas a step-wise action will be taken in case of a crime by first involving male members of the family followed by sub-tribe and then by other sections of the tribe.

A new section has been added which provides for action for false prosecution in civil and criminal matters while the defendants will be entitled to adequate compensation in criminal matters and compensatory costs in civil matters. Similarly, no person will be deprived of his property without adequate compensation as per prevailing market value in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in settled areas.

For the first time, funds at disposal of political agents have been brought under the audit by Auditor General of Pakistan.

Section 58A has been inserted into the FCR to make provision for jail inspection by the Fata tribunal, while the appellate authority and political agent rules will be framed for regulating the agency welfare fund.

President Zardari praised efforts of the Shaeed Bhutto Foundation which worked in Fata to pave the way for implementation of the reforms.

http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/13/major-changes-made-in-fcr-fata-people-get-political-rights.html

Source:

ANALYSIS: The ANP, FATA parliamentarians and reforms —Farhat Taj

2011-08-12T19:58:00.000-07:00

FATA parliamentarians take dictates from militant commanders in their area and are practically hostage to them. Under Taliban pressure, the parliamentarians raise their voices on the floor of the National Assembly or Senate and media outlets to oppose the demands for military operations against the militants in FATA

There seems to be a broad based consensus in all the major political parties of Pakistan on the issue of massive legal reforms in FATA. The consensus is that the Political Parties Act should be implemented in FATA, all established human rights be accorded to the people of FATA and the FCR be abolished or there be massive amendments to it to make it concur with human rights. The parties that hold this position include the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAR), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) and the People’s Party (Sherpao). The consensus was expressed in a conference about legal reforms in FATA by the PPP-linked Shaheed Bhutto Foundation in Peshawar in October 2009. On August 14, 2009, only a few months before the conference, President Zardari announced the promulgation of the Political Parties Act in FATA.

The president’s announcement, despite the political backing of the parties, has never been implemented to date despite the fact that the political parties continue to demand legal reforms in FATA. There seems no other explanation for the lack of implementation of the presidential order other than the de facto control of the area by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan to use it for strategic objectives in complete disregard of human rights and development in the area.

Now in the context of the ongoing debate in Pakistan over the formation of new provinces in the federation, Mr Afrasiab Khattak, the ANP leader, has suggested that representation be given in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to FATA. The suggestion is in line with the long-standing ANP demand that FATA be included in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This demand makes a lot of sense in terms of the socio-cultural and geographic affinity with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. All areas in FATA are much more integrated in terms of geography, culture, tribal links, familial ties, business connections and so on with the adjacent areas in Pakhtunkhwa than among themselves. For example, Dir is more integrated with Bajaur and Mohmand than Waziristan or Kurram, and Waziristan is more integrated with Bannu and Tank than with Charsadda or Nowshera and so on.

Some FATA parliamentarians have voiced their opposition to the ANP suggestion that FATA be given representation in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assembly. For example, Kamran Khan, an MNA from North Waziristan, recently said on a private channel’s programme that FATA should be made a separate province instead of its incorporation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa because there were many differences between the two. The differences, according to him, are the following: There is no police and judiciary system in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is more developed than FATA and FATA is facing exceptional circumstances in terms of terrorism.

It is true that there are some voices in FATA that demand a separate FATA province. However, one has to be alarmed when the demand for a separate FATA province comes from FATA parliamentarians. The reason is the conduct of the past as well as current FATA parliamentarians. History tells us that FATA parliamentarians have always aligned themselves with the government of Pakistan and have never showed any dissent. This makes their representativeness questionable from the perspective of the well being of the tribal people. Similarly, the current FATA parliamentarians cannot be trusted to speak with a free will given the fact that their area is under de facto control of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and their proxies — the militants. The parliamentarians probably could never have been elected without having made deals with the militant commanders in their area. This also suggests that their non-party based election, as opposed to the rest of Pakistan, was not held in a free and fair environment. Journalist Aqil Yousafzai has beautifully elaborated in his Urdu book, Operation Natamam (endless operation), that FATA parliamentarians take dictates from militant commanders in their area and are practically hostage to them. Under Taliban pressure, the parliamentarians raise their voices on the floor of the National Assembly or Senate and media outlets to oppose the demands for military operations against the militants in FATA.

The lack of development and negligible police and judiciary system in FATA that Mr Kamran Khan is referring to are due to the region’s legal isolation from the rest of Pakistan. The ANP, together with other political parties of Pakistan, are demanding an end to the isolation. The special circumstances related to terrorism that Kamran Khan pointed at are precisely what are making the ANP more relevant to FATA than many other parties in the country. The ANP has always been opposed to the root cause of the current terrorism in Pakistan — the abuse of religion for strategic use. The party also opposed the so-called Afghan jihad. It has been urging the Pakistan Army to conduct targeted military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda since 2002, the time when the army was reluctant to do so. Today the party extends political support to all targeted army operations against the Taliban. The ANP took a tough stance on militancy in Swat, although it temporarily succumbed to pressure tactics when it signed the peace deal with the Swati militants after suicide bombers were sent to its leadership. The ANP thus has a substantial role in freeing Swat from the clutches of the militants and has heavily scarified for its stance when hundreds of its workers were target killed, especially in Swat.

When was the last time the FATA parliamentarians took such a tough stance as the ANP has done on the issue of terrorism? Leave aside the issue of their stance on terrorism, what have FATA parliamentarians done to reduce the suffering of thousands of people from FATA who are IDPs? I have yet to meet any tribal people who mention any contribution by FATA parliamentarians to reduce the sufferings of the IDPs.

There may have been charges against the ANP in terms of bad governance, a problem of all Pakistan. But when it comes to its stance on terrorism in FATA, the ANP stands on a higher ‘moral’ ground than the FATA parliamentarians. Afrasiab Khattak’s suggestion for FATA representation in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assembly should also be seen in the context of this moral ground. As far as FATA parliamentarians are concerned, they should only be taken seriously after they have shown some evidence that they have the will to take on the militants in their areas.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and author of the book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban

Terry Glavin: A nail in the coffin of the Pakistani pantomime

2011-08-12T19:57:00.000-07:00

WAHEED AFRIDI/AFP/Getty

NATO supply trucks burn on the side of a road near Landi Kotal, Pakistan. Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants frequently target NATO supply convoys, especially oil tankers, during attacks across northwestern Pakistan and the lawless tribal belt on the Afghan border.

Terry Glavin Aug 11, 2011 – 10:54 AM ET

If the history of the 21st century’s first decade is ever properly written, the words “the war in Afghanistan” could probably serve as little more than an index entry from a footnote in a prominent chapter about Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. The ISI deserves at least a chapter of its own, if only for the spectacularly cunning confidence trick it managed to play, year after year after year, with the United States of America as its most gullible victim.

Billions of dollars wasted and tens of thousands of lives lost, all the result of an elaborate pantomime carried off by the ISI, a parasitic, third-rate military-industrial lie machine that the White House still fancies as an American “ally.” Chief among the ISI’s successes, from 2001 until even now, is the propaganda fiction that after September 11, 2001, the Pakistani military stopped providing succor and sustenance to Al Qaida and the Taliban, and that if those entitities were present in Pakistan after 2001 at all it was only on account of those savage Pakhtuns from the hill country in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and their primitive “hospitality” code of Pakhtunwali.

I strike a glancing blow at all that in my book, Come from The Shadows, which is due out in October. It’s one of several myths about Afghanistan that I easily dispose of (evidence is our friend) in the opening chapter, Welcome to Absurdistan. In dispelling the myth that the Pakhtuns of FATA are as angry about NATO drone strikes as the troops-out lobby keeps telling us, I have relied heavily on the splendid front-line work of the Pakistani journalist Farhat Taj, a research fellow at the University of Oslo. Last year, I noted her finding: “I have been discussing the issue of drone attacks with hundreds of people of Waziristan. They see the U.S. drone attacks as their liberators from the clutches of the terrorists into which, they say, their state has wilfully thrown them.”

Two years ago, she told the Washington Times that most of what passes for informed punditry about Pakistan’s tribal areas is drawn from third-hand journalism written byjournalists who don’t know the first thing about what they’re talking about. “They constantly distort the realities of our people and area. Most of them do not even bother to come and see what is happening.”

Now, Taj has got a book out, Taliban and Anti-Taliban. It is the result not just of historical scholarship but also roughly 2000 interviews and discussions undertaken throughout FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkwa (formerly the Northwest Frontier Province) over the past two years. A lot of nasty and violent people, along with very smart and well-situated people, are going to be quite displeased with what the book exposes, not least the nonsense that the Pakistani government would surrender the jihadist Arabs and Talib crackpots in the hill country, but the stubborn tribes just won’t permit it because of that “Pakhtunwali” thing. Taj writes: “Some first-hand interactions with the tribesmen would have provided the scholars and journalists with a wealth of empirical evidence to establish that no tribes in FATA can dare to host anyone wanted by the state.”

Further: “Where do Usama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri or other foreign terrorists fit in to this notion and practice of hospitality? Well-armed and battle hardened Al-Qaida terrorists never surrendered their weapons to the tribes in FATA. Instead they have overpowered the tribes and brutally killed those tribesmen who defied them. They entered Waziristan with full state consent and all the tribesmen who opposed their entry were killed with state collusion by the militants. Those that were left ran away or were overpowered by the militants covertly backed by the Pakistani state. If the Pakistani state wants today, no militants can ever stay in Waziristan or elsewhere in FATA.

“It is a myth that FATA tribes gave refuge to Al-Qaida terrorists under the code of Pakhtunwali. In the tribal context, public backing of any issues, including refuge to anyone, has to be discussed and agreed upon in a tribal jirga (council). . . I would challenge the scholars and journalists to produce evidence of any such jirgas. The fact is that Taliban and Al-Qaida banned the institution of jirga wherever they took control in FATA or at least rendered it ineffective through targeted killing and intimidation of the tribal leaders, and all this was thoroughly facilitated by the ISI. . .”

It’s pretty straightforward. The Frontier Crimes Regulations that apply in the otherwise lawless FATA region allow the Pakistani military to bulldoze entire towns if a tribe refuses to hand over a fugitive. The ISI has done precisely that for offences less grave than harbouring al Qaida. Indeed, the ISI did bulldoze villages, recklessly and unnecessarily, when it finally felt obliged to go after the Haqanni Talibs. What has the ISI done to go after Mullah Omar’s Taliban? Nothing. Why? Pakhtunwali? Please, get real.

I’ve only read the first few pages, but it promises to be a most useful book.

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/08/11/terry-glavin-a-nail-in-the-coffin-of-the-pakistani-pantomime/

National Post:

Terry Glavin as an author, journalist, editor of Transmontanus Booksand member of the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee. Read morehere.

Posted in: Canada, Full Comment, Policy Tags: 9/11, Afghanistan, Farhat Taj, Inter-Services Intelligence Agency,ISI, Pakistan Government, Pakistan Intelligence Agency, Taliban, War In Afghanistan, Waziristan

Farhat Taj's long awaited book Taliban and Anti-Taliban is out now

2011-08-10T19:50:00.001-07:00

Farhat Taj says the FATA tribes didn't give refuge to foreign militants. Instead, Pak military backed them | New book by Farhat Taj - You can order it at: http://www.c-s-p.org/Flyers/Taliban-and-Anti-Taliban1-4438-2960-9.htm

Taliban and Anti-Taliban

Author: Farhat Taj
Date Of Publication: Jul 2011
Isbn13: 978-1-4438-2960-1
Isbn: 1-4438-2960-9

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has been in the spotlight since 9/11. This tiny piece of land is crucial to all: a determinant of the military outcome in Afghanistan for international community; a strategic space for its hostile ally, Pakistan, for its ambitions in Afghanistan and beyond; a home to al-Qaeda, a special place in its mythology. Prospects of international and regional peace hinge on the situation in FATA; understanding its people and their ground reality has, thus, been more important than ever.

Based on extensive ground research in FATA, Taliban and Anti-Taliban reveals the indigenous tribal people’s blood-soaked relationships with the Taliban, Al-Qaida and the Pakistani military establishment and its intelligence apparatus. The book uncovers the heroic armed and non-violent struggle of the local population against the Taliban and Al-Qaida. It also documents the tribesmen’s feedback on some of the high profile literature authored in relation to FATA since 9/11 and exposes serious drawbacks in the writings of some of the famous FATA “experts” in the world.

Tribal resistance to the Taliban and Al-Qaida has been widely ignored in international academic and policy discourse, and in media reporting on the war on terror. Knowledge and understanding of this resistance is immensely important for people in the wider world to determine friends and foes in the global war on terror. Taliban and Anti-Taliban fills the void for the first time since 9/11.

This book is a must read for anyone and everyone interested in knowing what is going on inside FATA, the region dubbed as “the most dangerous place in the world” by the US.

Farhat Taj is a Pakhtun from the northwestern region of Pakistan. She is a well-known newspaper columnist in Pakistan and director of the documentary film Waziristan—A Culture Under Attack.

Price Uk Gbp: 39.99
Price Us Usd: 59.99

Sample pdf (including Table of Contents): http://www.c-s-p.org/Flyers/978-1-4438-2960-1-sample.pdf

http://www.c-s-p.org/Flyers/9781443829601.jpg

EDITORIAL: Saudi support: at what cost?

2011-08-10T18:17:00.000-07:00

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani termed his recent visit to Saudi Arabia as a ‘renewal of ties’. Now this is interesting. Why would Pakistan need to ‘renew’ its ties with its Saudi ‘lords’ who have wreaked havoc here in the name of Islam? But obviously this subject was not on Mr Gilani’s agenda. The discussions were focused on asking the Saudis to reactivate bilateral cooperation in the fields of science, defence, defence production, trade and commerce. The Pakistani side tried to persuade the Saudis to buy weapons from us. The defence production facilities in Pakistan produce more weapons than we need, which is why we try to sell the extra weapons to other countries. Prime Minister Gilani also requested the Saudi authorities for an extension in the deferred oil payment facility, which the Saudis will ‘consider’. Apart from performing Umrah, which seemed to be the primary purpose of the Pakistani side for visiting Saudi Arabia, it looks as if nothing substantial came out of the talks. The two sides discussed the Afghan situation in the post-US withdrawal scenario. Saudi Arabia may have stressed Pakistan’s crucial role in the region given the new developments but maybe the Saudis have forgotten their own role in pushing this region into a quagmire.

Even before the Afghan jihad, Saudi Arabia was able to influence the Pakistani leadership due to the power of petro-dollars. By dazzling our leadership with its wealth and dangling the ‘Kadhimain-Haramain-Sharifain’ title in front of the Pakistani public, the Saudi monarchy was able to get what it wanted from Pakistan. Be it exporting terrorism to Iran, Saudi Arabia’s nemesis, by funding sectarian madrassas that are actually terror factories, fanning sectarian conflict inside Pakistan through these same madrassas, buying land in Pakistan to ensure food security in the barren kingdom, or hunting endangered animals and birds with their UAE brethren on Pakistani soil, the Arab sheikhs have lorded it in and over Pakistan. This, however, could not have happened unless our leaders allowed it, dazzled as they have been by the lure of money. The seeds of Arabisation of Pakistan germinated in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s time and bore plentiful fruit under General Ziaul Haq’s regime. None of our leaders, be they civilian or military, thought much about the consequences of getting too close to the Arab overlords. The poison that the Saudiisation of Pakistan produced has now spread countrywide. King Abdullah’s words during Prime Minister Gilani’s visit are of significance. The monarch said, “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are one country; they are more than friends and more than brothers.” Instead of sending shockwaves down our leadership’s spine, Prime Minister Gilani welcomed his statement and went a step further by saying, “Pakistan’s security was Saudi Arabia’s security and Saudi Arabia’s security was Pakistan’s security.”

If this is how our leaders are going to behave — bowing to every whim of the monarchs of Saudi Arabia — they might as well move all Pakistanis to the Rab’ al Khali (the empty quarter, the massive desert in the heart of Saudi Arabia where nothing grows or lives) and invite the Arab sheikhs to reside in Pakistan instead. Arab influence has already turned Pakistan into a blood-soaked battlefield. The fault lies with Pakistan’s leaders who have never questioned the Arab sheikhs for their dubious and nefarious activities in the region and in Pakistan. Pakistani society has become intolerant over the years because of various reasons, but most importantly because of Saudi Arabia’s powerful influence in our internal matters. The growth of Wahabiism and extremism in Pakistan is mostly because of funding by Arab sheikhs. Is it not time to bid adieu to such negative influences instead of asking them for ‘renewal’ of ties? *

ANALYSIS: Pakistan’s foreign policy: grandeur of delusions — II —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-08-10T18:13:00.000-07:00

The most dangerous outcome of the decades of indoctrination is a mutant urban middle class that grew up on a steady diet of the concocted stories of victories and revisionist history in the Pakistan Studies textbooks

“Our object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large. We have no aggressive designs against anyone. We stand by the United Nations Charter and will gladly make our full contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world” — Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s address on August 15, 1947.

I had noted last week that the recent events in Turkey indicate that any military’s control over the domestic and foreign affairs of a nation-state is unsustainable and discordant with the new geopolitical realities. There is nothing new about this. The single-party communist and non-communist governments, military juntas in Latin America, the Ba’athist regimes or the mom and pop dictatorships a la Ferdinand and Emelia Marcos all had one thing in common — the national security state paradigm was central to their domestic policies.

The foreign policy of these regimes was by and large reflective of their domestic policies. Leon Trotsky had aptly noted: “Foreign policy is everywhere and always a continuation of domestic policy, for it is conducted by the same ruling class and pursues the same historic goals.” In case of these assorted dictatorships, their militaries played the pivotal role in carrying out these policies and held sway either as an institution or sharing power with the ruling individual, clique or party.

Before the echo of Quaid-e-Azam’s above quoted words — spoken at the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting Service — could fade, the signs of what was to become Pakistan’s lot started manifesting themselves. The events starting with the October 1947 tribal incursion into Kashmir from the Pakistani side, which eventually snowballed into a war between the two new countries, also set the stage for the national security state paradigm becoming the sheet-anchor of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies. In this case, Trotsky’s adage was turned on its head.

The involvement of the military in achieving the nascent Pakistan’s immediate foreign policy objectives when the democratic institutions of the country were in an embryonic form set the stage for its larger-than-life role in the affairs of the new state. In due course, the military enterprise displaced and/or co-opted both the civilian bureaucracy and the politicians. Three martial laws were merely an outward manifestation of this chokehold that the military has continuously exercised over Pakistan’s polity.

The establishment’s subsequent misadventures in Kashmir actually created a situation where the domestic policy continued to be crafted to suit the means and ends of the foreign policy agenda. The state’s patronage of the Islamist groups and religio-political parties was used to support this jingoism and the symbiotic relationship peaked under General Ziaul Haq with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. To raise such jihadist cadres, the Pakistani state moved from the primordial secularism of Quaid-e-Azam to the obscurantist and Arabised Islamisation of Pakistan under Zia. The proxy warfare that started in Kashmir in 1947 remains the bedrock of Pakistan’s defence strategy. The quest for so-called strategic depth in Afghanistan is also a manifestation of this phenomenon. Ironically, a conventional military has been betting on an unconventional war strategy that relies on the presumed but untested success of guerrilla warfare in the event it is run over in a war.

The initial call to the holy war in Kashmir was rather generic but the next decades saw the full-fledged use of highly indoctrinated jihadist proxies inducted into Kashmir, especially after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. All pretences to the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination were jettisoned along the way. Organisations like the JKLF — supported initially by the Pakistani state — were abandoned in favour of Islamist proxies, when they started moving away from the Pakistani position to demand a “Kashmir for Kashmiris”, i.e. independence from both India and Pakistan.

The admixture of military jingoism and jihadism unleashed a massive radicalisation of Pakistani society that eventually culminated in the rise of several domestic militant Islamist outfits with ties to similar international groups. But the most dangerous outcome of the decades of indoctrination is a mutant urban middle class that grew up on a steady diet of the concocted stories of victories and revisionist history in the Pakistan Studies textbooks. Quaid-e-Azam’s nationalism — itself not without a modicum of communalism — was eventually replaced by full-fledged Pakistani chauvinism. Any desire for ‘peace within and peace without’ was replaced by faith in mutually assured destruction through nukes. The grandeur of delusions perhaps could not be more grandiose and delusional.

The 19th-century US Senator Stephen Decatur’s words, “Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong,” seems to have become the national creed, replacing the Quaid’s desire “to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large”. In contrast to Turkey’s “zero problem” foreign policy aimed at harmonious relations with its neighbouring, regional and international states, Pakistan’s foreign policy became a zero-sum paradigm vis-à-vis its neighbours.

However, the hyper-nationalists, especially in the intelligentsia, are losing sight of the fact that all aforementioned dictatorial regimes had one more thing in common — a transition from authoritarianism to democracy that set in motion the processes that eventually saw civilian supremacy established over the military. The transitions to democracy may have had various different routes and means, ranging from the implosion of regimes like the USSR or through protests and mass movements, but one common denominator was the role of civil society and scholars as the guiding force as well as the watchdogs of this civilian oversight.

Whether it is establishing the constitutional parameters for robust defence ministries or exercising control over the military through making it accountable via transparency in budgeting, planning and procurement processes, it is ultimately the opinion leaders who have to ask the hard questions of both the military and the politicians. But before one can objectively ask such questions, one has to get past Decatur’s delusional belief in his country’s certitude. And how aptly had Senator Carl Schurz responded to Decatur: “My country, right or wrong; if right, to be kept right; and if wrong, to be set right.”

While we are holding seminars on de-radicalisation, it may not be a bad idea to hold one to discuss how we got here. Senator Schurz’s remark was an instant reality-check; perhaps that could be the theme of a frank dialogue.

(Concluded)

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki

COMMENT: We are living in a Taliban state —Nayyer Khan

2011-08-10T18:11:00.000-07:00

The ‘forced fasting’ of Zia’s time, like many other such laws, was never reversed by the PPP despite its third time in power. The reason could be that during Zia’s years, the fundamentalists became so powerful that they were now the masters of the country’s fate

Recently, a police SHO barged into Nairang Gallery located on Jail Road, Lahore, which is an art gallery-cum-rendezvous spot for the city’s social and cultural elite, intelligentsia and artistic and bohemian classes, and harassed the staff as well as visitors and customers present for violating the ‘holiness’ of Ramzan. According to him, food and beverages were being served there during fasting hours. He also objected to the attire of the female staff and customers there, calling it revealing and thus un-Islamic, and against the sacredness of Ramzan. He did not like both genders mixing freely either. He misbehaved with and even manhandled the female curator of the gallery. This incident has stirred a wave of condemnation and protest from civil society and the cultured classes.

This kind of forced ‘sanctification’ of Ramzan is a routine matter in small cities and towns in Pakistan. Such highhandedness by the authorities in small places is seldom reported in the media. For instance, the following incident, which, somehow, did get reported in a leading daily may give a faint idea as to what kind of thrusting of one’s values on others is prevalent in our society.

On September 16, 2009, during the month of Ramzan, about two dozen people were made to parade semi-naked in a market place in Mianwali, with their hands tied by the clothes stripped off their bodies, on the orders of a deputy district officer before they were put into the lockup. The guilt of those subjected to this humiliation was that they were caught sipping tea at some tea stalls at the railway station and bus stands during fasting timings.

This act of disgracing human beings reminds one of the black days of General Zia when ‘Ramzan violators’ were given similar treatment by the authorities, by painting their faces black or shaving their heads in public. But the irony of the matter is that this practice continues even during the government of a supposedly secular and moderate political party. However, with events like the one that took place in Mianwali, one fails to find the difference between the present regime and that of Zia.

According to the present laws, the administration grants special permission to some eateries to serve food and tea to patients, travellers, etc, during the fast. The above action against alleged Ramzan violators by the local administration of Mianwali raises two questions. First, how did the police establish that the alleged Ramzan violators were not patients or travellers? Second, how would a patient or a traveller know that the eatery serving food and beverages during fasting timings does not have such permission from the administration? Obviously, a customer would presume that such an eatery has permission. He would not demand to see the license first before ordering any eatables. The customer could be an uneducated person who may not even be able to read such a paper issued by the administration to the eatery. Then why were those citizens of Pakistan punished by the authorities?

Before the black year of 1977 — when Zia took over Pakistan — all restaurants here served food and beverages during fasting hours in Ramzan. The only difference was that during Ramzan, the doors and windows of the eateries were covered with thick curtains so that those who were fasting and passing by the restaurant were not tempted by the eating and drinking activities going on inside the eatery.

Since the inception of Pakistan till the government of the PPP before Zia’s coup, the above-mentioned norm remained in practice. After the PPP’s regaining of power in 1988, many draconian laws and practices from Zia’s regime were undone. Unfortunately, however, the ‘forced fasting’ of Zia’s time, like many other such laws, was never reversed by the PPP despite its third time in power. The reason could be that during Zia’s years, the fundamentalists became so powerful that they were now the masters of the country’s fate.

In any civilised society, it is considered an individual’s prerogative to follow a certain religious practice or not. Many people in the cities of Pakistan live forced bachelor lives away from their native towns. Even living in their home towns, many people have their work places situated far away from their homes. The only source of food and beverage for such people is the eateries. Many from amongst them suffer various medical conditions that force them to eat and drink regularly. For instance, a diabetic person has to eat at regular intervals to maintain his blood sugar level. A kidney patient has to take a lot of liquids to flush his kidneys. A person suffering from low blood pressure can faint without sufficient salt intake. There are so many other instances where the old, sick and weak have to indulge in a normal food and beverage intake to live. Where would such people go if they are not even allowed to drink water outside their homes? Thirst and hunger can be felt at any time whether one is in the concealment of a house or moving out in the open.

If fasting is a religious duty then so is offering prayers. In the ‘model’ police state of Saudi Arabia, clergymen called mutawas go about the streets and market places with sticks in their hands during prayer times and harass and even beat up people to join prayer offerings in the nearby mosque. Why is Pakistan this one step behind Saudi Arabia? If laws here force people to follow one religious duty, why do they not make them follow the other one too?

What is a Taliban mindset? It is to impose one’s religious values on others. The laws of Pakistan overlap with Taliban laws. Let us admit that we are living in a semi-Taliban state, which may become a full Taliban state one day.

The writer’s areas of interests are history, religion and cross-cultural conflicts. He can be reached at nayyer.khan@gmail.com

ANALYSIS: A very misleading report —Farhat Taj

2011-08-05T21:22:00.000-07:00

Tribal leaders in South Waziristan (and later all over FATA), who opposed or potentially could oppose the militants’ escape into their area in the wake of the US’s bombing in Afghanistan were killed in pursuit of trapping the US in Afghanistan

On July 31, 2011, a programme on a private TV channel was aired in which a TV crew was transported by the Pakistan Army to Wana, South Waziristan. The army soldiers escorted the team throughout their stay in Wana. The team talked with the soldiers stationed in the area along with some tribesmen, and also aired the development work initiated by the army in Waziristan. The whole programme was misleading.

Before their departure to Waziristan, the anchorperson of the programme said this: “The norm is that when you go to a new place, you first ask around to get a knowhow about the area. We are going to Waziristan, but there is no one to ask about this area.” This is factually wrong. People from Waziristan can be found all over Pakistan in state institutions, universities, the transport business and other job markets. Many people from the area, including the entire Mehsud tribe, are IDPs outside Waziristan. But one has to remember that the TV programme was not meant to air the views of the people of Waziristan or to educate the people of Pakistan about the people of Waziristan. The programme was a piece of propaganda. It was meant to present the perspective of the Pakistan Army, which simply does not concur with the ground reality in Waziristan. It is thus no wonder that the anchorperson could ‘see’ none among the thousands of people from Waziristan scattered all over Pakistan for a chat about the area prior to the journey.

The anchorperson interviewed some tribesmen from Waziristan. One of the tribesmen was the son of Maulana Noor Muhamamd, who the anchorperson introduced as a “shaheed”. This jihadi maulana, recently killed in a suicide attack, always had deep links with the military establishment of Pakistan since the days of the so-called Afghan jihad. He had strong relations with al Qaeda and the Taliban leaders. He had the blood of the innocent people of Waziristan on his hands. How could the television channel declare such a person a shaheed?

The TV programme did not even casually refer to the 200 plus tribal leaders of South Waziristan who have been target killed because they opposed the presence of Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Waziristan. Their families hold the ISI responsible for their brutal assassinations. It is pertinent to mention that a prominent journalist, on a recent TV talk show said that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the Musharraf government sent a delegation to Afghanistan to pursue Mullah Omar to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US. This was the public stance of the government. Privately, the delegation urged Mullah Omar to defy the US by refusing to surrender bin Laden. The government wanted to drag and humiliate the US into the Afghan quagmire just like the USSR. The journalist stopped at this point, but there is much more in the follow up than what he said. Tribal leaders in South Waziristan (and later all over FATA), who opposed or potentially could oppose the militants’ escape into their area in the wake of the US’s bombing in Afghanistan were killed in pursuit of trapping the US in Afghanistan. This was according to the plan to create a leadership vacuum in tribal society to be filled by the state-assisted Taliban and al Qaeda.

The TV programme remained silent about the presence of the Punjabi Taliban and other foreign militants in the area. Not far from Wana bazaar, where the TV team spoke from, is Doag, the centre of the Punjabi Taliban. The Wazir tribesmen constantly point out (privately for security concerns) that even the Waziri terrorists are a minority. A majority of the militants, they inform, are the Punjabi Taliban. The TV report failed to show the training centre for suicide bombers in the area. The report ignored the ‘good’ Waziri Taliban commander, Mullah Nazir, based in Wana. The report failed to show the petrol station in Wana bazaar where Farooq Yargul Khel was target killed in 2003 precisely because he had publicly declared that he would never allow the militants to enter Wana bazaar and would evict them from the rest of Waziristan through a tribal lashkar. He was the first among the target-killed leaders of Waziristan for their opposition to the Taliban and al Qaeda.

The programme did not even mention the disastrous army agreement with al Qaeda-led Taliban commander, Nek Mohammad, in 2004 that discarded the tribal leaders’-led political order in the area. The agreement is tantamount to dictating a new social contract at gunpoint between the Wazir tribe and Pakistani state, whereby Waziristan was handed over to al Qaeda and the Taliban. The report was also silent on the Wazir tribe’s clashes with Uzbek militants in 2007. Pakistan Army weapons, including long-range artillery, were freely used against the Uzbek militants. Instead of killing the Uzbeks with help from the Wazir tribe, the army authorities let them flee to North Waziristan so as to put them under the influence of the Haqqani network in the area to direct their jihadi energies towards the international forces in Afghanistan. There is nothing in the programme that might suggest that the TV crew had reflected on the commonsense observation of how any local people could provide honest answers in the presence of the army authorities.

A bizarre part of the programme is when its female anchorperson, sitting in a topless military vehicle, veiled herself as the vehicle entered Wana bazaar. “This is the culture here and we have to show respect to this culture,” she pronounced from behind the face veil. The fact is that not all women in the tribal area wear the face veil. Rather than showing respect to the tribal culture, the journalist displayed insensitivity to the tribal norm that accepts that casual female visitors to the area, like this journalist, are exempt from the local pardah (veil) norms. But, let us not forget that the journalist was reporting in Wana bazaar, an area close to the centre of the Punjabi Taliban. Most probably, it was fear of the Punjabi Taliban rather than respect for tribal culture that made her wear a face veil in Wana bazaar.

FATA has been converted into a black hole where reality is created and presented to the world in a manner that suits the security establishment of Pakistan. This TV programme is just such an example. Within hours of the programme, the Chinese authorities reportedly blamed the Uzbek militants based in FATA for recent terror attacks in a Muslim-dominated region of the country. Within hours of the programme, there was a drone strike in South Waziristan that killed militants. But, sadly, such media presentations only serve to mislead the people of Pakistan who have no direct access to FATA. It is most unfortunate that Pakistani media outlets are part and parcel of the military’s propaganda to mislead the people of Pakistan.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban

Dr Feroz Ahmad views on Pakistan’s economy, politics and Afghan revolution

2011-08-05T02:52:00.000-07:00

Below is an excerpt from Hassan N. Gardezi's article in weekly Viewpointonline on the thoughts of renowned Marxist intellectual and journalist Dr Feroz Ahmad. Rest of the article can be read here.

Perspectives on Pakistan’s economy and politics

As a political economist Feroz believed that social injustice and oppression in Pakistan thrived on the policy of dependent development followed by successive governments, which was essentially a continuation of the colonial system. In its neo-colonial relationship with the global capitalist economy and markets Pakistan had adopted a course of development, which had sustained a class structure hardly capable of supporting strong democratic institutions. A weak and comprador capitalist class, a class of landlords and tribal chiefs, and an expanding middle class largely divorced from the productive sector of the economy were not the pillars on which the edifice of viable and equitable democracy could be built.

In an article in the last issue of the Forum (October 1979) Feroz correctly forewarned that unless there is a fundamental change in the course of Pakistan’s dependent development strategy the country’s international standing will deteriorate, the international financial institutions (IFIs) will increase their meddling in the affairs of the country and the government will be forced to undertake emergency measures causing great hardship to the people. Needless to say that the Planning Commission of Pakistan has never deviated from the course of development advised by the American experts. Ten years later ”meddling” by the Washington based IFIs took the form of a lean an mean package of structural adjustments sold to Pakistan’s establishment by the IMF and World Bank imposing backbreaking austerities on the working people, something that is now regarded as a normal reality of globalization.

On the political front, Feroz dealt extensively with two issues of great importance for peace and security of the people of Pakistan, one being the country’s multi-national or multi-ethnic reality, and the other having to do with the dynamics of relations with Afghanistan, particularly since the Saur revolution of April 1978. Let us take the second issue first as it has landed the people of Pakistan into the quagmire of seemingly endless violence and insecurity.

Feroz welcomed the Saur revolution that took place in Afghanistan in April, 1978, ending the two hundred year old despotic rule of the Durrani family. But he also discerned immediately that crooked schemes were being hatched under the leadership of the United States to co-opt Zia’s dictatorship to sabotage the Afghanistan revolution. In a wide-ranging article in the June 1978 issue of Pakistan Forum contextualizing Afghanistan’s revolution in its history, culture and geopolitical realities, he warned Pakistan’s leadership not to play in the hands of American imperialism and abstain from promoting “jihad” and counter revolutionary activities across the western border. It is very likely, he wrote, that Pakistan’s counterrevolutionary moves in Afghanistan will backfire and instead of gaining anything Pakistan will end up pay a heavy price. Had anyone in the position of power in Pakistan been listening to Feroz, the people of Pakistan and the region would have been spared the bloody chaos the country is in today.

Regarding the multi-national, multi-ethnic reality of Pakistan, I can still recall my first face -to-face meeting with Feroz some 40 years ago when he came for his job interview at Algoma University in Canada. When all the formalities of his visit were over and the two of us sat down in the dimly lit lounge of our mill town hotel he gave me a passionate lecture in his flawless Urdu on how the Muhajirs and the Punjabi establishment had reduced his fellow Sindhis into a minority in their own homeland. He surely sounded like a firebrand Sindhi nationalist at the time. But during our association over the years, I found his views on this subject also go through his characteristic objective and scientific reasoning as a sociologist and demographer. His earlier analyses of relations between dominant and dominated groups in Pakistan were grounded in the nationality theory traceable to the classic texts of Stalin and Lenin. In his later writings he basically turned away from the use of the terms “nations” and “nationalities” in favour of the term ethnic and ethnicity to describe Pakistan’s cultural, linguistic and regional pluralism.

Yet, whatever the terms used for Pakistan’s cultural pluralism and disparities of political power and economic privilege, Feroz remained steadfast in his conviction that all culturally and linguistically distinct entities of Pakistan must have equal rights and opportunities to advance. Suppression of diversity in the name of national unity was not only a violation of human rights, but counter-productive to the aim of keeping the federation together. At the root of Pakistan’s “national” conflict, wrote Feroz, lies class division and class conflict. Therefore, the oppressed masses must seek class unity across national and ethnic boundaries and must not succumb to chauvinistic sentiments.

COMMENT: Pakistan’s foreign policy: grandeur of delusions — I —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-08-03T21:05:00.000-07:00

Just as war is too serious a matter to entrust to military men, foreign policy is a concept largely foreign to the military planners

“It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring” — Carl Sagan.

So the CIA’s Islamabad station chief has left Pakistan — the second to leave in under one year — and did so, ostensibly, for health reasons as an AFP report stated. Coming on the heels of the CIA man’s departure was the US State Department’s statement that its diplomats in Pakistan are unable to travel freely. One wondered if the health crisis at the US mission was so bad that Pakistan had decided to quarantine all the US diplomats to Islamabad. Well, whatever the state of the physical wellbeing of the people involved in diplomacy, they are dealing with a patient, i.e. the Pak-US relationship, which is critically ill.

According to Mark Toner of the US State Department, the US staffers in Pakistan now have to carry a certificate to travel outside Islamabad. Apparently, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, was recently stopped from boarding a plane as he did not have the said certificate, but was eventually allowed to travel. This was not the first episode of its kind as a senior US official, reportedly an intelligence officer, had been similarly stopped not too long ago.

Following the arrest of Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, the US-based lobbyist who headed the Kashmir American Council (KAC) and has been accused of being an ISI agent, things are not exactly a cakewalk for the Pakistani diplomats in Washington, DC. One can be sure that the Fai fiasco has been added to the list of diplomatic fires, which Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, has been putting out at the Capitol Hill, the State Department, the Pentagon and, of course, the US media, for far too long. His recent mango soiree in Chicago, marking the arrival of the heavenly Pakistani fruit in the US, was yet another vigorous attempt to add some sweetness to the souring relations between the two countries.

But imagine, if our ambassador had been stopped from travelling outside the DC area, the mango mania that gripped not just the greater Chicago area but the US leaders and the Pakistani — as well as the Indian — diasporas, would have ended with a whimper even before the party at the Palmer House Hilton got going. I am not trying to make light of a very serious matter that had the potential to send diplomatic relations into a nosedive. After Islamabad’s recent actions, Mark Toner was asked point-blank if the US would consider a reciprocal action against the Pakistani diplomats and he responded “reciprocity is always a consideration...but in this case, we are working with the government of Pakistan”.

Fortunately, sanity prevailed here because of the top civilian diplomats involved. But no thanks to the Cold War relics in Pakistan’s military brass, who persistently feel satisfied and reassured in their delusions and continue to resort to bravado in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. Frankly, it is not even the delusions of grandeur or the savoir syndrome that the Pakistani security establishment has been persistently suffering that is bothersome. What is troubling is that the magnitude of the grandeur of this delusion keeps on multiplying logarithmically by the day. The sooner the Pakistani establishment comprehends the geopolitical universe, as it really exists — not the way it imagines it — and the fact Kakul, Aabpara and Rawalpindi are not really the centre of this universe, the better it would be for Pakistan, the region and the world.

What is really fascinating is the coterie of retired brigadiers and ambassadors, many having served at obscure stations, writing about the Pak-US relationship, especially in the context of Afghanistan. Their writings echo the Pakistani security establishment’s thought process and mysteriously precede the rolling out of the latter’s plans and the so-called ‘massive operations’ against the militants.

Brigadier (retd) Shaukat Qadir, who is the former president of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, writes: “Policy formulation is a complicated business and foreign policy is perhaps the most difficult of all policies to flesh out since it involves relations with other countries; each of which have their own policies.” Now who would have guessed that foreign policy might entail dealing with, well, foreign countries, which may actually be really diverse! The fact of the matter is that those peddling ‘innovative’ ideas like above, or their cohorts, were at the helm in the military and civil establishment, when the misadventures like Ghulam Nabi Fai were being planned and executed.

FBI Special Agent Sarah Linden’s affidavit in the Dr Fai’s case makes an interesting read. The code words allegedly used by Dr Fai and his military handlers (who have been named in the document) such as requesting ‘half a dozen Brylcreem’ meaning $ 60,000, are cheesier than a B-movie. But more pathetic is the fact that the sleuths hatched a stupid conspiracy to do something, which if legitimate, could have been done legally. In fact, the US Department of Justice had written to Dr Fai in March 2010 to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) if he was acting as an agent of Pakistan. He categorically denied any connection to Pakistan at the time and did not register under the FARA. But just as a few in the Pakistani-American community were getting ready to rally for his defence now, Dr Fai apparently admitted last week, to have received money from the ISI. The retired ‘grandmasters’ had got it wrong then and are bound to fumble again!

As the recent events in Turkey have shown, the praetorian control over the domestic and foreign affairs of a nation is untenable and incompatible with the changing geopolitical situation. Turkey’s ‘zero problem’ foreign policy aimed at harmonious relations with its neighbours as well as regional and international actors, democratic changes tipping the domestic power balance against military and withering of the national security state paradigm, culminated in consolidation of the civilian control there.

In democracies, civilian control over the military is inevitable; Turkey was not an exception and neither is Pakistan. Just as war is too serious a matter to entrust to military men, foreign policy is a concept largely foreign to the military planners — the constellation of geopolitical events suggests that they will have to cede this domain.

Postscript: As per news reports, Islamabad is already backing off its stand on restricting US diplomats’ movement!

(To be continued)

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\08\04\story_4-8-2011_pg3_2

2011-08-01T17:27:00.000-07:00

’حملہ آوروں نے پاکستان سے تربیت حاصل کی تھی‘

چین نے الزام لگایا ہے کہ اس کے مغربی خطے سنکیانگ کے شہر کاشغر میں شہریوں پر حالیہ حملے میں ملوث افراد نے پاکستان میں تربیت حاصل کی تھی۔ دوسری جانب پاکستان کے دفترِ خارجہ نے ایک بیان میں کہا ہے کہ دہشت گردی کے تمام واقعات قابلِ مذمت ہیں اور چین کی مکمل حمایت کرتے ہیں۔

چین نے الزام لگایا ہے کہ اس کے مغربی خطے سنکیانگ کے شہر کاشغر میں شہریوں پر حالیہ حملے میں ملوث افراد نے پاکستان میں تربیت حاصل کی تھی۔

چین کے سرکاری خبر رساں ادارے زنہوا کے مطابق اتوار کو شدت پسندوں کی جانب سے ایک ریستوران کو آگ لگانے اور بعد میں شہریوں کو قتل کرنے کے واقعے میں چھ افراد ہلاک اور تین پولیس اہلکاروں سمیت پندرہ افراد زخمی ہو گئے تھے۔

زنہوا کے مطابق پولیس نے پانچ مشتبہ افراد کو فائرنگ کر کے ہلاک کر دیا ہے۔

تاہم ابھی تک پاکستان کی جانب سے چین کے الزام پر کوئی ردعمل سامنے نہیں آیا ہے اور نہ ہی ان اطلاعات کی تصدیق ہو سکی ہے کہ آئی ایس آئی کے سربراہ لیفٹیننٹ جنرل احمد شجاع پاشا چین کے دورے پر ہیں۔

اتوار کو چین کی سرکاری خبر رساں ایجنسی زنہوا نے کاشغر کی شہری حکومت سے منسوب ایک بیان میں کہا ہے کہ ابتدائی تفتیش سے معلوم ہوا ہے کہ گروپ کے رہنماؤں نے دہشت گرد تنظیم’ ایسٹ ترکستان اسلامک موومنٹ ‘ یا ای ایم ٹی آئی ایم کے پاکستان میں قائم کیمپوں میں دھماکہ خیز مود اور آتشی اسلحہ کی تیاری کی تربیت حاصل کی، اور اس کے بعد خطے سینکیانگ میں دہشت گرد کارروائیاں منظم کرنے کے لیے داخل ہوئے۔

پیر کو حکومت نے جائے وقوعہ سے بھاگنے والے دو مشتبہ افراد کے وارنٹ گرفتاری بھی جاری کیے ہیں۔ پولیس نے ان افراد کی شناخت انتیس سالہ ممتیالی تلوالدی اور چونتیس سالہ تورسن حسن کے نام سے کی ہے۔ پولیس نے ان افراد کی گرفتاری کے حوالے سے کوئی خبر دینے پر پندرہ ہزار تین سو چوراسی ڈالرز انعام کا اعلان بھی کیا ہے۔

زنہوا کے مطابق سینکیانگ اکیڈیمی آف سوشل سائنسز میں واقع وسطی ایشیا کے سینٹر میں محقق پئن زیپنگ نے مشرقی ترکستان کی علیحدگی پسند فورسز میں ایسٹ ترکستان اسلامک موومنٹ کو’ سب سے زیادہ تشدد پسند اور خطرناک قرار دیا ہے۔ ان کا کہنا ہے کہ یہ تنظیم پاک افغان سرحدی علاقے میں کہیں قائم ہے۔

پئن زیپنگ اور دیگر ماہرین کے خیال میں یہ تنظیم عام طور پر اپنے کارکنوں کو سینکیانگ روانہ کرنے سے پہلے خودکش بم حملوں، کار بم دھماکوں کی تربیت فراہم کرتی ہے تاہم ان دنوں علاقے میں انٹرنیٹ کے ذریعے بم بنانے کی ترکیبیں پھیلاتی ہے۔

امریکی خبر رساں ادارے رائٹرز کے مطابق سینکیانگ حکومت کی جانب سے جاری ہونے والے بیان میں کوئی ثبوت فراہم نہیں کیا گیا ہے جبکہ چینی کام کے مطابق اس گروپ کے القاعدہ سے تعلقات ہیں۔

یاد رہے کہ سینکیانگ میں پچھلے سال مسلمان اوغر آبادی اور چینی ہان آبادی میں نسلی فسادات پھوٹ پڑے تھے جن میں دو سو افراد ہلاک ہو گئے تھے۔

مآخذ : بی بی سی اردو

Pashtuns in Karachi and Saleem Safi's ramblings - by Rahnavard

2011-07-30T21:21:00.000-07:00

Saleem Safi with Hizbul Mujahidin chief

کراچی کے حالات پر سلیم صافی صاحب کے ۱۲ جولائی کو لکھے گئے کالم اور اس نوعیت کے ان کے دیگر تبصرے پڑھ کر فیصلہ نہیں ہوپاتا کہ ہنسا جائے یا رویا جائے. امیر حمزہ مروت صاحب سے منسوب بیان پر تو حیرت ہوئی سو ہوئی لیکن سلیم صافی صاحب نے اپنا سیاسی سفر جہاں سے شروع کیا تھا، اس پس منظر کو ذہن میں لایا جائے تو اس داستان امیر حمزہ کی غایت سمجھ آ جاتی ہے. میاں طفیل، قاضی حسین احمد اور منور حسن وغیرہ کے قدموں میں بیٹھنے سے انسان کو دروغ بافی کا جو مرض لگ جاتا ہے، وہ عرصے تک جان نہیں چھوڑتا اور کسی نہ کسی شکل میں سر اٹھاتا رہتا ہے.

حقیقت یہ ہے کہ خان عبدالولی خان اور الطاف حسین کے مابین جب حالات میں مفاہمت ہوئی تھی، آج اسے پچیس سال سے اوپر ہو چکے ہیں. اس دوران پختونوں کے اقتصادی طرز حیات میں کئی جوہری تبدیلیاں رونما ہو چکی ہیں. کسسے گمان تھا کہ کراچی دنیا بھر میں پختونوں کا سب سے بڑا شہر قرار پاے گا. کون سوچ سکتا تھا کہ پاکستان کی قومی کرکٹ ٹیم کے کپتان اور سب سے مایہ ناز بیٹسمین کا تعلق کراچی کی پختون برادری سے ہوگا. کوئی کہہ سکتا تھا کہ اردو ٹی وی چینلوں کے مقبول ترین خبر رسانوں میں تین پختون صف اول میں شمار ہوں گے؟

اب آپ کراچی جائیں تو نظر آتا ہے کہ پختون ان بہت ساری اقتصادی سرگرمیوں میں شامل ہیں جو کبھی دیگر قومیتوں، خصوصا مہاجروں کا اجارہ سمجھی جاتی تھیں. دکانوں کے سیلز مین ہوں یا این جی اوز کے کارپردازان، کمپیوٹر آپریٹر ہوں یا دواساز کمپنیوں کے مارکیٹنگ ایجنٹ، حتی کہ بیوٹی پارلروں پر کام کرنے والی خواتین اور انشورنس ایجنٹوں تک میں جا بجا جدید تعلیم یافتہ پختون نوجوان دکھائی دیں گے.

دوسری جانب، تعلیمی نظام کے انحطاط اور گرتے ہوۓ معاشی اشاریوں نے بہت سے مہاجر نوجوانوں کو رکشہ چلانے، بندرگاہ پر بوجھ اٹھانے اور تعمیراتی شعبے میں کام کرنے پر مجبور کردیا ہے. اب وہ تقسیم کار اپنا واضح وجود نہیں رکھتی جسے اسی کی دہائی میں امن کے قیام کے لئے دلیل کے طور پر پیش کیا جاتا تھا.

پڑھ لکھ جانے کی وجہ سے کراچی میں سرکاری اراضیات پر قبضے کے کاروبار میں بھی، پختون اب پڑھے لکھے مہاجر یا پنجابی کی معاونت کے طلب گار نہیں رہے اور زنگ آلود سرکاری پہیے کو رشوت کا تیل دینے کا کام براہ راست سیکھ گئے ہیں. سیاسی شعور کی فزونی کا سب سے اہم اور ایم کیو ایم کے لئے تشویش ناک مظہر تب سامنے آیا جب دو پختون اے این پی کے ٹکٹ پر صوبائی اسمبلی میں پہنچ گئے.

لوگوں کو خدشہ ہے کہ نئی ابھرتی ہوئی پختون مڈل کلاس پاکستان کی شہری انتخابی سیاست کے داؤ پیچ جان گئی ہے اور اب دھاندلی کا جواب دھاندلی سے ہی ملے گا. اس سیاسی اجارہ داری کے گرد گھومنے والے تشدد سے بھرپور کھیل میں پیپلز پارٹی کا کردار مرکزی ہر گز نہیں بلکہ وہ تو خود اپنے پارہ نان کو بچانے کی فکر میں ہے. زود یا بدیر ایم کیو ایم کو احساس ہو جائے گا کہ ابھرتی ہوئی پختون شہری مڈل کلاس کو ایک زندہ حقیقت اور ایک اہم "اسٹیک ہولڈر" کے طور پر تسلیم کرنا ہی پڑے گا اور بقائے باہمی کا راستہ نکالنے اور شوربے کی اس قاب میں پختون کو اس کے حصے کے دو نوالے دینے کے سوا کوئی چارہ نہیں ہے

سلیم صافی کا کالم ملاخطہ فرمائیں۔

COMMENT: Baheer: three currents of Hamza Shinwari’s poetry —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-07-27T20:22:00.000-07:00

Hamza Baba’s verse is free of Marxist or other European influences. It is perhaps this originality of thought and language that puts him in the league of Hafiz, Saadi, Rumi and Jami

“Insaan yem, da fitrat pa taqazo ke na raazam,

Shaheen yem, da karghano pa panjo ke na raazam,

Yaw sind yem da sehba, da perzonay waham josh,

Laikin za da kam-zarfo pa kaaso ke na raazam” — Amir Hamza Khan Shinwari.

(I am a human whom even the nature cannot restrain,

Like a falcon I am; the paws of crows cannot reach me,

I am an ocean of wine (of love and knowledge), in high tide of passion,

Of which, a drop cannot the goblets of these upstarts hold.)

Though in vain this time, the crows did try to desecrate the mausoleum of one of the finest Pashtuns that ever lived. Last week, terrorists carried out an attack — fourth in two years — on the final resting place of the greatest Pashto ghazal poet, Amir Hamza Khan Shinwari — known affectionately as Hamza Baba — in Landi Kotal, Khyber Agency. Hats off to the shrine’s caretaker Muhammad Ikram and the khasadar militiamen who refused to vacate the shrine and put up resistance, forcing the militants to flee.

Adherents of the ideology of pure hate have attacked an apostle of pure love yet again, as they have done at the shrines of Sufis like Haji Sahib Turangzai, Rehman Baba, Pir Baba, Baba Farid Ganj-e-Shakar, Abdullah Shah Ghazi and Data Ganj Bakhsh, all over Pakistan. However, there are many who still insist on a dialogue with the peddlers of absolute poison that al Qaeda and its local affiliates are. There is a lot to be said about this dialogue. But today I only wish to remember Hamza Baba for the poised, peaceful, passionate, Pashtun Sufi that he was.

I wondered how the Persians would respond if Hafiz Shirazi’s tomb was vandalised or how the Turks would react to sacrilege of Jalaluddin Rumi’s grave, while reading Hamza Baba’s verses — a work at par with the greats of Persian Sufi poetry. The Persian language, especially its ghazal (love sonnet) form and Sufism have a unique kinship but conceptualising the mystical worldview from a native perspective and formulating it in chaste Pashto had perhaps not been attempted before Hamza Baba.

Sufi orders and indeed Sufi poets like Mirza Khan Ansari of the Roshaniyya order, Kazim Khan Shaida and, of course, Rahman Baba had existed in Pashtun society long before Hamza Baba. In fact, Hamza Baba recognised Ansari and Rahman Baba as his poetic antecedents. However, as Professor Yar Muhammad Maghmoom, has noted in his monograph ‘Hamza’s ghazal and Pashtun mysticism’, Ansari and Shaida had heavy Persian influence on their work. Contrarily, Hamza Baba’s mystic motifs as well as his poetic devices and tools are rooted deeply, yet effortlessly, in the Pashtun lands and Pashtunwali (the Pashtun culture and code of conduct).

Hamza Baba had not made a conscious effort to de-Persianise his work but his thought and creative output are so indigenous that even the use of short poetic meter prevalent in Persian and an occasional Arabic or Persian phrase does not appear to be a transplant. Hamza Baba’s metaphor, allegory and diction are nuanced pointers towards his Pashtun nationalism. Just like his mysticism was not imported, his nationalism too has arisen from the mountains of Khyber and the plains of Peshawar. Unlike the progressive poetry of Pashtun nationalists like Ghani Khan and Ajmal Khattak, and even Allama Iqbal and Faiz, Hamza Baba’s verse is free of Marxist or other European influences. It is perhaps this originality of thought and language that puts him in the league of Hafiz, Saadi, Rumi and Jami.

Three intertwined key currents — or ‘Baheer’, as he has titled one of his books — stand out in Hamza Baba’s poetry, i.e. devotion to ghazal, Pashtunwali and mysticism. He developed his dialectic around the romanticism, figures, forms and norms of Pashtun society, which he deploys to resolve the dichotomy faced by a mystic in pursuit of wahdat-al-wajud (Unity of Being). He says:

“Ta ka kha Pashtun shuay no insan ba shay,

Biya ka kha insaan shuay, Musalman ba shay.”

(First be a good Pashtun and you shall become a good human being,

And only when you become a good human being, will you become a good Muslim.)

Interestingly, these currents flow from and merge back into the person of his Chishti Sufi master, Syed Sattar Shah, known in Peshawar as Badshah Jan. Syed Sattar Shah was the son of Syed Burhan Shah and had moved to Peshawar from Hazara and lived inside the Dabgari Gate of the old walled-city. Hamza Baba was born and raised in Lawargi (Landi Kotal) but his family owned a house in Mohallah Sakhi Shah-e-Mardan (named after a shrine dedicated to Hazrat Ali Murtaza RA) inside Barizqan (popularly but inaccurately called Bayriskay) Gate, a short walk away from Badshah Jan’s residence.

Hamza Baba used to write poetry in Urdu but Badshah Jan, who himself composed poetry under pen-name ‘bay-nawa’ (voiceless), instructed him to write his verse in Pashto and ordered another of his disciples, Rafiq Shinwari — a musician — to compose and sing this verse. Hamza Baba was not really happy with the marching orders but complied and there was no looking back for him. He came to be known as the father of the Pashto ghazal (baba-e-ghazal) a title in which he took great pride and his verses to this effect are well known. Perhaps less known is his humility as a Chishti who was devoted to his Sheikh and attributed this success to Badshah Jan. In a ghazal written at the shrine of his master, he says:

“Pardah-pokh wo cheh “Sattar” wo da aiboono,

Cheh da zarroono Badshah Jan wo, haghah da wo,

Da Hamza da gado-wado wainagano

Pa rishtia cheh qadardan wo, hagha da wo.”

(Sattar — he who covers up one’s lapses — was he,

If there was a Badshah (king) of hearts — it was he,

Who could understand my gibberish?

But one who appreciated it, was he.)

Hamza Baba was a polymath: a poet, writer, dramatist, humorist, lyricist, musician, film-writer, broadcaster, translator but above all a humanist. If Khushal Khan Khattak was the warrior poet (sahib-e-saif-o-qalam), Hamza Baba carried pen in one hand and the candle of love in the other, and that too in a manner befitting of an unassuming Chishti saint with prowess over both knowledge and modesty (sahib-e-ilm-o-hilm).

A column cannot begin to define even one facet of this multidimensional Pashtun prodigy and in Hamza Baba’s words:

“Maa Hamza neemah ke khabarah prekhwa,

Neema ba biya sta pa ratlah wayamah.”

(I will leave my talk unfinished; we shall conclude upon your return.)

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\07\28\story_28-7-2011_pg3_2

VIEW: Dealing with the drones —Elf Habib

2011-07-22T19:58:00.000-07:00

Pakistan and terrorists can no longer exist together and Pakistan can never crush them alone. So rather than trading the nuances of autonomy and the conditions of action by its own forces, it must go for genuine unrestricted and unconditional global cooperation

Stopping the drone attacks on terrorist dens has been stirred into the most sizzling national concern and crucial policy agenda for the government. Most parts of the media had long trumpeted them as the most obdurate and wilful violation of our airspace, sovereignty and national honour and the cause of collateral damage that breeds more terrorism. Some petty palooka politicians like Imran Khan and anti-American clergy staged dharnas (sit-ins) at Peshawar and Karachi provoking the PML-N to brand their ballistics as a covert effort by the agencies to create new test-tube politicians. But the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad added a new twist to the tempest. Our ignominy and the inability to explain the presence of the world’s most wanted terrorist in the proximity of the premier military academy had few parallels in the annals of the incompetence and deceit by the forces ostensibly assigned to capture that quarry. Yet through a strange spin, the agencies and the media manoeuvred to manage the popular mood and memories of the bloodshed, bombs, brutalities and destruction perpetrated by Osama and the anger and hatred against him and diverted instead the entire focus to drones and unauthorised incursions. Even our parliament, rather than parsing the circumstances and collaring the culprits for the blunder, passed a resolution to stop the drones.

The solutions suggested to stop them, however, have been ridiculously naïve, myopic and counterproductive. Chaudhry Nisar pressed to use nuclear missiles to shoot them, prompting the air chief’s relatively more logical retort that the predators then would be protected by NATO. Imran and his cohorts also growled to interdict NATO supplies. The demand was subsequently also adopted by parliament. Scrubbing the Shamsi Air Base contract and authorising hunting sprees to the UAE Amirs was also elicited as an effective antidote. Some incendiary clerics even asked to sever diplomatic relations with our allies. The government circles also keep orchestrating an equally bizarre alternative to transfer the predators to Pakistan. This evidently is no solution as drones used by Pakistan certainly would not be showering flowers or sumptuous cuisine on the terrorists or sprinkling water, nutrients and pesticides on the crops and orchards in this remote region. This could certainly be carried out by ordinary planes and helicopters already amassed by the agencies. So the solution can be written off as a mere fixation to gather more fancy arsenals.

Proposals like stopping NATO supplies are equally ineffective as some safer substitutes are already being exploited, leaving Pakistan to face hefty penalties for reneging upon its international commitments. The loss of remuneration, employment and covert contribution to our nether markets through smuggling and pilferage from them would actually far exceed any intended impact on the allies. Dharnas, similarly, are not only futile but rather more damaging as they distract and drain the law enforcement agencies bracing the sprawling terrorist networks. Dharnas could, however, be made effective if the enthusiasts actually move to encircle, impede and incapacitate terrorist centres and operations. This is because there lies the real root and the rot that precipitated these raids.

These solutions, in fact, project the drones as an issue in isolation from its real cause just like stressing the symptoms of a scourge without realising and remedying its causative factors. The dilemma of the drones, evidently, cannot be solved without extirpating terrorist havens. There were no drones before their eruption in these terrains roiled and roused the entire industrialised and democratic world and our neighbours to dismantle these hatcheries. Drones were selected as an innovative viable option for lack of writ or access to these areas. A real panacea thus would evidently be to initiate an effective alternative action like surrounding these spots, severing contraband supplies and revamping the reconnaissance to neuter the terrorist potential. We also accept this need yet plead for a more opportune schedule because of constraints like being already too tied on the eastern border, consolidating the cleansed segments and countering the threats in other areas. Realising this, the allies plug in to accomplish a part of our own avowed mission. But this stirs our notions about the sanctity of our sovereignty and the infringement of our soil and space. The question evidently is to dispassionately dissect this diatribe in the backdrop of the world’s resolve and consensus against a far more colossus devastation, disturbance and denial of the ascent of human thought and civilisation. Our sovereignty actually was shredded long ago by the terrorist hordes of varying breeds who trespassed to ravage our lands, lives, peace and aspirations. The drone raiders, on the contrary, happen to be our allies in the war against them. They never make any claims on our soil, space or resources but merely move in for a few moments to mop up some of the menace. The collateral damage from these strikes is an inevitable and unfortunate aspect of every war craft. Sovereignty among the allies stuck against the same enemy also subsumes a secondary concern. Over 160,000 American and British soldiers landed on the French shores to expel the Germans. Poland was carved despite its neutrality. Hectoring terrorist havoc is too overwhelming and overpowering to be deterred by the nuances of autonomy and collateral damage. They are rather construed as a cloak to protect the terrorists because suspending drone raids without any effective alternative would obviously escalate their potential. Pakistan and terrorists can no longer exist together and Pakistan can never crush them alone. So rather than trading the nuances of autonomy and the conditions of action by its own forces, it must go for genuine unrestricted and unconditional global cooperation. Drones can only be stopped by pursuing a really effective and collectively verifiable alternative. The allies, of course, also must assist and ease some of our genuine constraints including an assurance to restrain India, as they did following the flare up fanned by the onslaughts against the Indian parliament and Mumbai sites.

But the real key to the conundrum is a genuine realistic change in the mindset that terrorism or covert actions in any form have no future or relevance in the modern democratic polities shaped by explicit expression of the dominant aspirations of a nation. As a result, Haqqani or Gul Bahadur bands would be utterly ineffective in any multilateral consensus arrangements in Afghanistan. Relying on them for any putative strategic depth in Afghanistan would be perilously counterproductive. Even the obsession of a strategic depth by a nation haunted by hunger, disease, illiteracy, scarcity of resources and avenues, inability to defray its mounting debts and ignominy of a perennial begging bowl syndrome has to be realistically toned down.

The writer is an academic and freelance columnist. He can be reached at habibpu@yahoo.com

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\07\23\story_23-7-2011_pg3_2

ANALYSIS: De-radicalisation without security paradigm shift —Farhat Taj

2011-07-22T19:45:00.001-07:00

The current radicalisation in the Barelvi heartland, just as in the rest of Pakistan, is the fruition of the state policy of using religious bigotry for foreign policy objectives. This must change for real de-radicalisation to take effect

It is interesting to see that the Pakistan Army has initiated a de-radicalisation effort in Swat and in this regard recently a seminar was held in the city that was given wide media coverage in Pakistan. Is de-radicalisation a real effort to bring about change in society? One would like to appreciate it, but it seems to be too little and above all too non-serious. A radicalisation plan also needs to focus on the rest of Pakistan, especially Punjab — the most populous province. Punjab is the heartland of Barelvi Islam, which is supposed to be a peaceful version of South Asian Islam due to its strong links with the Sufi traditions rooted in the pre-Islam past of the region. “Ever since Pakistan was created, the Barelvis have been the Islamic radicals’ most effective obstacle,” writes the journalist Owen Bennett Jones in his book, Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm (page 10). This may have been true in the past, but not anymore.

Barelvi clerics as well as lawyers elevated the killer of Governor Punjab Salmaan Taseer to the status of a hero. Most of Pakistan’s fabricated blasphemy cases against religious minorities keep coming from the Barelvi-dominated Punjab. Reportedly, a few days ago on the eve of Shab-e-Barat, a Muslim festival, the Sikh community in Lahore was stopped from conducting their religious rituals on the grounds that “celebrating Shab-e-Barat was more important than Sikh rituals”. Shia Muslims and other religious minorities, especially the Ahmedis, are often targeted. An irrational anti-Americanism pervades, especially among many urbanite Punjabis. The Punjab University campus is suffocating under the control of the student wing of the extremist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Since General Zia’s time, religious groups have made a transition from the periphery to mainstream education, politics, media and state institutions in Punjab.

Radicalisation has become part and parcel of the political economy. The radical madrassa business is well spread out in Punjab. There seems to be a vicious alliance between the people who make money through illegal means like smuggling, corruption, abuse of authority, and Islamist institutions. As Muslims, the law-breakers believe that God will hold them accountable for their deeds in the life hereafter. Thus they make generous donations out of the ill-gotten money to madrassas and Islamic charities to ‘please’ God. Radical Muslims do not mind donations coming from ill-gotten wealth. I do not know of any Islamist organisation that has refused to take donations from people who are publicly known for corruption. The two feed on each other. One placates a guilty conscience and the other entrenches his power and control through the expansion of the political Islamist economy.

Radicalisation has also become an important part of the businesses run by multinational companies and other small and big enterprises in Pakistan. Mobile phone companies are earning millions of rupees from religious text messages that people communicate to each other every single day. The hospitality industry in Pakistan is earning a lot by providing services for religious gatherings. Islamic banks have been established. There are mobile phones with religious ringtones. There are soft drinks with religious names. There are shops selling symbols of Muslim religiosity, such as a range of crockery with Islamic symbols and inscriptions.

The current radicalisation in the Barelvi heartland, just as in the rest of Pakistan, is the fruition of the state policy of using religious bigotry for foreign policy objectives. This must change for real de-radicalisation to take effect. There are no signs of it happening. In April the chief of army staff, General Kayani, claimed that the terrorists’ “backbone has been broken” but some days after this statement Osama bin Laden was located and killed by the US commandos in a military area in Abbottabad. Military spokesmen have been pointing towards cross-border militant attacks on Pakistani troops from the Afghan side. Pakistan’s defence minister ‘threatened’ the US that Pakistan will pull back its troops from the Pak-Afghan border if it suspended military aid to Pakistan. Nobody knows what the military plans to do with terrorists in its custody, like Muslim Khan from Swat. Our courts have released well-known sectarian terrorist Malik Ishaq. Personally, I may not agree but let me say that I keep hearing from people in the military’s strategic space, FATA: why does the army not eliminate famous terrorists like Muslim Khan and Malik Ishaq? Controversial Hadith literature, like the Ghazva-e-Hind hadith whose authenticity is questionable in Muslim scholarship, continues to be promoted in the dominant pro-security establishment media to perpetuate hatred.

No plans of de-radicalisation will produce any effect on the ground unless a strategic shift takes place in the country’s India-centric policy paradigm based on promoting radical religious forces inside Pakistan and exporting violent jihad to neighbouring Afghanistan and India. Unless that happens, any de-radicalisation programmes will not change the mindset of the purposely-radicalised sections of our population. In the absence of a paradigm shift, de-radicalisation programmes like the seminar in Swat will be hardly anything more than PR exercises for foreigners, several of whom participated in the seminar. I am afraid that foreign participant writers of such events might ultimately end up producing misleading literature on the de-radicalisation process. This will only add to the already existing body of misleading literature on FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa produced by western authors since 9/11.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\07\23\story_23-7-2011_pg3_4

COMMENT: De-radicalisation: deception or determination? —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-07-20T19:44:00.000-07:00

It is imperative to look at the blunders committed in the name of national security, strategic depth and ideological frontiers, if one seeks real solutions. Ideological and religious reconstruction requires both words and actions

Just as Pakistan was starting to witness yet another round of political violence in Karachi, a three-day national seminar on de-radicalisation, organised by the Pakistan Army, concluded in Swat earlier this month. Politicians, military leaders and opinion leaders from Pakistan as well as guests from other countries, attended the heavily guarded gathering. The full text of the lectures delivered and the conclusions of the seminar have not been made public yet but several speeches were instantly available through traditional and contemporary media.

Regardless of the merits or demerits of the event, the Pakistan Army deserves an acknowledgment for arranging the programme and for inviting a few token speakers who quite forcefully disagree with the army’s approach to handling the domestic and foreign affairs. One had hoped though that now when the word ‘de-radicalisation’, in its unhyphenated form, has entered the lexicon of counterterrorism, the people and intelligentsia of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA — regions worst hit by terror — had a more robust representation at the seminar.

Despite being in the top tier of the countries battered by terrorism in the name of religion, Pakistan is a relatively new entrant to the arena of establishing de-radicalisation programmes, the stillborn National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) notwithstanding. In his concluding address, Prime Minister Gilani made some remarks about the revival of NACTA, changes in the laws and criminal justice system, and the training and empowerment of the law enforcement agencies. But conspicuously absent from his — and General Ashfaq Kayani’s — speech was a candid acknowledgment of the genesis of terrorism coupled with religiosity, and how to go about developing a counter-narrative to that, if at all.

In a slick manner, General Kayani stuck to his current mantra, i.e. the army is subservient to the civilian institutions and will act in a circumspect manner in aid of the political leadership. While emphasising the ‘holistic’ nature of and taking full credit for pioneering the de-radicalisation programme, he said: “De-radicalisation effort was a result of the demand placed on the army by the post-operation environment. Driven by the detention of thousands of miscreants after the operation, our de-radicalisation programme was built around four pillars: de-radicalisation of juveniles, de-radicalisation of selected ‘reconcilable’ detainees, de-radicalisation of families of selected detainees to which they would fall back on release and the de-radicalisation of certain villages in general, from which the bulk of militants had originated.”

General Kayani — likely speaking for domestic consumption — was on the dot though in stating that military means alone cannot defeat extremism and the militancy that follows it in tandem. The General, prima facie, wants to treat a metastatic cancer but appears content to put a band aid on its minor manifestations without even trying to name, let alone exploring for the primary disease and attempting to remove it. Not a word was uttered about how a region that had voted overwhelmingly for centre-left political parties in February 2008 fell to the terrorists in under one year. It was Afzal Khan Lala of the Awami National Party (ANP), who pointed out in his speech that the militants were imposed on Swat from outside and the administration did not just stand idle but gave massive patronage to the terrorists. General Kayani was remiss in defining the contours of his ‘counter-radicalisation’ vision or how the jihadists came to rule the roost in Pakistan, in the first place.

This hapless job was left for Mr Gilani to tackle, who — speaking unmistakably to foreign audience — said: “The challenge of unintended radicalism and consequent terrorism is complex and a real barrier to a common goal of peace and stability. What we have witnessed today is a consequence of history and has an internal, regional and global context. Without a dispassionate strategy appraisal we can go wrong in our assessment and policy formulation on re-radicalisation (sic)...Pakistan’s security paradigm owes its genesis to traumatic events of the US-led Afghan jihad, inept post-Cold War handling of Afghanistan by the west, festering regional conflicts and post-9/11 war in Afghanistan.” Before emphasising his four ‘Ds’ of the de-radicalisation programme viz “dialogue, development, deterrence and defeating the extremists”, Mr Gilani went on to blame everyone and their uncle for imposing jihadism on Pakistan. The fifth ‘D’ might as well be denial!

The preponderance of research on de-radicalisation comes from work with four broad categories of groups and individuals. The first such group is the violent criminals, especially gang-members, who have been studied well, including their rehabilitation. However, research on how the organised political violence ends is still quite sparse. The work with Nazi and neo-Nazi groups in Europe, former communists in Europe and Japan and the radical Islamists in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, is where most of the current ‘best practices’ and benchmarks of success or failure and recidivism have emanated from.

There is growing awareness among the experts worldwide that defeat on the battlefield alone might not be enough to make the militants abandon violence. Just as prevention of new recruitment into radical and violent movements is imperative, so is the endeavour to induce de-radicalisation (implying renouncing violence and violent ideology), disengagement (abstaining from violence for personal, family or societal reasons without renunciation of violence), rehabilitation and the so-called ‘counter-radicalisation’ (preventing radicalisation), which is becoming pivotal to the counterterrorism efforts.

The de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation cannot succeed without first conducting an honest root cause analysis instead of a symptomatic treatment approach. The building of a counter-narrative requires serious introspection and asking hard questions. Laying the blame at others’ doorsteps suggests pathetic insight, if not outright dishonesty. It is imperative to look at the blunders committed in the name of national security, strategic depth and ideological frontiers, if one seeks real solutions. Ideological and religious reconstruction requires both words and actions. In an environment, where upright leaders like Salmaan Taseer are slain and rationalist scholars like Javed Ahmed Ghamdi are forced into self-exile, while assassins like Mumtaz Qadri are feted and terrorists like Malik Ishaq go scot-free, it would take far more than a seminar to defang, deglamorise, delegitimise and discredit the terrorists.

The state has to disown the violent characters and delusional security paradigms it has hatched over the past several decades. To orient the militants to de-radicalisation, the state has to reorient inwards rather than eyeing Kabul or Delhi. Otherwise, the de-radicalisation programmes may appear to be yet another deceptive fad to milk the foreign cash cows rather than a determined effort towards reform.

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\07\21\story_21-7-2011_pg3_2

ANALYSIS: The Shakils of FATA and the other stereotype —Farhat Taj

2011-07-16T08:28:00.001-07:00

Let’s not forget that Dr Shakil’s native Bara in Khyber Agency is ravaged by the religious militants and reportedly Dr Shakil himself, like countless residents of Bara, suffered at the hands of the Mangal Bagh gang based in his native area

A British newspaper, The Guardian, recently reported that intelligence officials of Pakistan arrested Shakil Afridi, a doctor from Khyber Agency, FATA, for organising a fake vaccination campaign for the CIA in Abbottabad whereby a nurse was sent into Osama bin Laden’s house to collect DNA samples of bin Laden’s family members. The ISI, according to the newspaper, is angry with the CIA for recruiting Pakistani citizens to spy on bin Laden’s residence in Abbottabad and Afridi is ‘the most involved’ among CIA spies. He is under custody since late May and the US now fears for his safety.

What will become of Afridi — will he be punished or released by the ISI — will depend on the CIA-ISI negotiations to work out their differences over the conduct of the war on terror in the post-OBL period. Let’s not forget that some months back another alleged US spy, Raymond Davis, was arrested in Lahore. The religious right-wingers in Pakistan ran a campaign of hate against him. The security establishment seemingly encouraged the campaign and then Davis was released overnight in a suspicious diyat (blood money) deal. Interestingly, the religious lobby, a natural ally of the military establishment, fell silent after his departure.

General Pasha, the ISI chief, landed in Washington on July 13 to put the CIA-ISI’s tense intelligence cooperation back on track in the post-OBL period. The Guardian has also reported that Dr Shakil may soon be released as part of the negotiations between the two intelligence agencies during Pasha’s visit to the US.

Interestingly, the religious parties and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have not started a hate campaign against Afridi demanding severe punishment for the tribesman. What kind of narrative and discourse will they use should they unleash a campaign against the tribal doctor? The right-wingers and pro-establishment media have always described the tribal people through the colonial stereotype of ‘furiously autonomous’ and ‘religious’ people who are taking revenge from the US and the Pakistani state through acts of terrorism. Dr Shakil clearly does not fit into the stereotype.

The British colonials have also left behind this stereotype: “Rule the Punjabi, intimidate the Sindhi, honour the Baloch and buy a Pakhtun.” This stereotype might be invoked to assassinate Dr Afridi’s character, especially keeping in view the possibility that the US might have offered him a hefty sum of money for such a daring adventure.

Due to lack of publicly available information, it is difficult to say what motivated Dr Shakil to collaborate with the US to trap Osama bin Laden. Dr Shakil could have been motivated by the amount of money offered by the CIA or his collaboration with the US could be rooted in the frustration that many tribesmen feel about the Pakistani state for having (wilfully) surrendered them to violent jihadis led by bin Laden or it could be a combination of both.

Let’s not forget that Dr Shakil’s native Bara in Khyber Agency is ravaged by the religious militants and reportedly Dr Shakil himself, like countless residents of Bara, suffered at the hands of the Mangal Bagh gang based in his native area. I have been writing on these pages that the people of FATA are sick and tired of the militants in the area and several of them may go to any extent to get rid of them. The term ‘any extent’ here implies that there may be people in FATA who, disappointed with the Pakistani state, may be willing to collaborate with the US to get rid of the militants.

I had several discussions back in 2009 and 2010 with several family members of some of the anti-Taliban tribal leaders from Waziristan who had been target-killed by, in the view of their relatives, the ISI through the militants to create a leadership vacuum for the militants in the tribal society in order to camouflage the bases of the state’s jihad against the international forces in Afghanistan in the area by creating an artificial tribal public support for the militants through violence. The relatives specially referred to the Angoor Ada operation back in 2008 whereby the US forces stationed in Afghanistan physically entered Waziristan to kill certain militants. They said they would welcome the entry of the US forces inside Waziristan to conduct intelligence-based targeted operations against what they called “the ISI’s assets”. They said they had been baselessly accused of having given refuge to al Qaeda militants, which they said they never did and if they had done so, why would their close family members be killed by the militants? But they said they would really like to offer hospitality to the Americans in case they physically enter Waziristan.

Commenting on the ongoing bloodshed in Kurram Agency and, seemingly, the state’s unwillingness to protect the people, a tribesman from Kurram wrote this on an internet blog: “Our forefathers were facing such situation in the last decades of the 19th century when they were under Afghan cruel rule, so they revolted against rulers and invited the British forces to secure their dignity, integrity, and sovereignty...Now our ruler is helpless in front of our enemy and unable to defend us. I warn that NATO is on our western border, and we have the right to repeat history.”

The point that I wish to make is that a decade-long bloodshed in FATA, largely perceived as inflicted by the state for foreign policy objectives, has accumulated hatred against the militants and frustration with the Pakistani state. As an expression of their hatred and frustration we might see in future more people of FATA collaborating with the US and NATO forces to get rid of the militants as well as frustrate the state’s jihadi designs. Should that happen, the religious and pro-establishment forces might attribute it to the essentialism based on the colonial stereotype, “buy a Pakhtun”, or disregard such people as ‘Mir Jafar and Mir Qasim’ among the ‘fiercely autonomous and religious’ tribesmen, thus absolving their own anti-Americanism and state jihadism of any responsibility for the security crisis in FATA. This attribution will be wrong, just like all narratives of the ‘fiercely autonomous and religious’ tribesmen are far from the truth.

It is important for FATA observers around the world to rise above the colonial stereotypes and discourses of the Pakistani right-wingers about FATA. The area should be seen as a normal human society that is trapped in a prolonged security crisis. Any society in the world in a similar situation would produce desperate people engaging in desperate acts for survival or in response to perceived injustices. In this context, we might be seeing more and more people like Dr Shakil emerging from FATA in the future.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban

VIEW: Remembering Habib Jalib Baloch —Sanaullah Baloch

2011-07-14T11:00:00.001-07:00

While in the Musharraf era, the focus of the establishment was to eliminate patriots from the Baloch tribal elite such as Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the current strategy has shifted to the destruction of the middle strata leadership to weaken the grassroots connections and Baloch intelligentsia

Despite the tall claims, in the last six decades no Pakistani government has ceased its policy of exploitation, extermination and elimination of moderate Baloch political leaders and activists. The cold-blooded murder of former Senator Habib Jalib Baloch, sectary general of the Balochistan National Party (BNP), including target killing of Maula Bakhsh Dashti in Turbat, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August 2006, Mir Balaach Marri in November 2007, Zahid Baloch in 2008, brutal daylight abductions and killing of three senior Baloch leaders in April 2009 and assassination attempt on prominent Baloch intellectual Jan Mohammad Dashti in February 2009 are a fraction of systematic and slow-motion “genocide” in Balochistan, an ongoing process that has been taking place since 1948.

Habib Jalib, a former Chairman of the Baloch Student Organisation (BSO), was a committed fellow. He was not just a Baloch nationalist but a human rights defender, intellectual, author, Supreme Court lawyer, ex-parliamentarian and an active political campaigner.

Systematic killing of Habib Jalib Baloch was the beginning of Islamabad’s policy of “kill and dump” in Balochistan. Authorities wanted to ensure that they would continue their brutalities in a threat-free environment, silencing strong Baloch voices before the launch of a full-fledged genocidal operation.

There cannot be a greater loss to the Baloch nationalist movement than the cold-blooded murder of ideological, educated and rational leaders. Jalib was a literate leader of the Baloch movement who had a clear sense of Baloch nationalism. Along with Ghulam Mohammad Baloch and Maula Baksh Dashti, he also belonged to a middle-class family. He was purely a self-made man who was widely respected in the BNP cadre as well as in other political parties. The killing of Dashti and now that of Jalib proves that NP and BNP face a common threat, which needs to be fought with unity.

The people of Balochistan are going through a very painful period of their history. The Baloch history is full of violent conflicts. They had a long struggle against British colonialism, conflict with Afghans, Iran and encroachers, but they did not experience such a brutal and inhuman repression by any regime and state that they are experiencing by the hands of the “rulers” in Islamabad.

According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s (HRCP’s) recent report, “By far the largest number of enforced disappearances in any province of the country has been reported from Balochistan. In a recent aggravation, bodies of missing persons have started turning up in the province with increasing frequency. The right to life and freedom from arbitrary detention is violated with impunity.”

The century-long conflict with British started after killing of Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan in November 1839 and continued till 1947. During the colonial era not a single case of enforced disappearances was reported and neither was there a humiliating case of killing a Baloch elder or political activist. They jailed, punished and even executed several “rebels” but in a very lawful and respectable manner.

But unfortunately, the state of Pakistan and its security apparatus have been employing brute methods to silence the people’s voice for self-determination and equality.

A fresh episode of Baloch-Islamabad conflict intensified in March 2005. The world watched incredulously as Pervez Musharraf declared an all-out war on Balochistan — on Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Makran, Jalawan and particularly against Nawab Bugti. Tanks rolled into Dera Bugti and other parts of Balochistan in January 2005, forces began to smash Bugti’s house and Dera Bugti town, killing dozens of civilians and leaving him besieged in a few rooms without electricity and water. Then Musharraf came up with an aggressive and inhuman plan to use all available air and ground power to eliminate Nawab Bugti.

In order to silence Baloch political dissidents, General Musharraf sanctioned the state-sponsored practice of enforced disappearances, abducting family members, relatives and even female members of top political activists to divert their attention and compelled them to remain quiet during the military operation in the province.

Islamabad could not get away with a strong perception and the fact that prevails in Balochistan regarding the discriminatory and abusive role of military and paramilitary forces in prolonging political conflict. There is a common understanding and opinion that certain security agencies and their death squads are involve in assassinating high-profile Baloch leaders and activists.

While in the Musharraf era, the focus of the establishment was to eliminate patriots from the Baloch tribal elite such as Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the current strategy has shifted to the destruction of the middle strata leadership to weaken the grassroots connections and Baloch intelligentsia.

The impact of Islamabad’s harsh and inhuman policies has been particularly severe in the province. The current and long-term consequences of this practice pose a serious detriment to the living conditions of the Baloch people, including efforts for sustainable development, and to any prospects for peace in the region.

The writer is a Baloch leader and former senator. He can be reached at balochbnp@gmail.com

EDITORIAL: Mending Pak-US relations

2011-07-14T10:58:00.001-07:00

At the 140th Corps Commanders’ Conference held at GHQ, Pakistan’s military top brass was trying to be all macho by saying that our military could do without US assistance by depending on its own resources. This was a response to the US suspension of $ 800 million in military aid to Pakistan. Whether this is a permanent aid cut or just a “pause” as has been said officially, only time will tell. China, it seems, has come to the rescue — for the time being. “China has always provided assistance to Pakistan, helping it improve people’s livelihood and realise the sustainable development of its economy and society. China will continue to do so in the future,” said a spokesman of China’s Foreign Ministry. China has been providing military assistance to Pakistan for many years now but the jury is out if we were to expect it to match or increase aid in view of US aid suspension.

Pakistan is in a deep flux. Drone strikes are continuing with ferocity in Waziristan, both South Waziristan and North Waziristan. Pakistan Army has launched an offensive in Kurram Agency, which does not make much sense given that the real problem lies in North Waziristan. According to an ISPR statement, “The aim of operation in Kurram Agency is to clear the area of miscreants involved in terrorism, kidnapping, killing of locals and blocking of road connecting lower with upper Kurram.” Has the army just woken up to the fact that the road was blocked? The army paid no attention when Shias were being abducted and killed left, right and centre in Parachinar by the Taliban. An operation in Kurram Agency has led to a massive increase in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). This is another crisis in the making.

On the other hand, the Haqqani network and Mullah Omar have not been able to convince the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to quit attacking Pakistani security agencies and civilians. The TTP was provided safe havens in North Waziristan at the assurance of the Haqqani network but so far this deal has not worked out. Now the TTP has found safe havens in Afghanistan, which is why mortar shells are being fired from across the border and coordinated attacks are also taking place. It seems that the Kurram offensive is just our military’s way of clearing Kurram Agency for their proxies based in North Waziristan. An operation in North Waziristan will then be carried out once the Haqqani network and their affiliates are shifted to Kurram. The people of Kurram, especially the Shias, have seen so much hardship over the years at the hands of sectarian monsters created by the military establishment.

The relations between Pakistan and the US are getting worse day by day. DG ISI General Shuja Pasha is in Washington to “co-ordinate intelligence matters”. The problem with Pak-US relations is that there is a pattern of pulling it back from the brink every time but this cannot be papered over for long. The stakes are too high for both countries to actually have a breakdown of relations. The only ones to gain from this will be the terrorists. Differences notwithstanding, this relationship has to be mended. The fundamental threat to it remains the military establishment’s duality in policy vis-à-vis terrorist networks. *

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\07\14\story_14-7-2011_pg3_1

COMMENT: Mini cold war on Afghan frontier —Dr Mohammad Taqi

2011-07-14T10:56:00.000-07:00

The Pakistani military leadership has been betting on a US withdrawal from Afghanistan that leaves the field wide open for them. It is an erroneous assumption and will likely result in the Pakistani security establishment biting off more than it can chew

You know something has gone really awry in the Pak-US relationship when the Pakistanis bring out their heavy political artillery against the US. Now who would not take Pakistan’s Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar seriously? Speaking to a television channel, the defence minister has threatened to withdraw Pakistani troops from the Pak-Afghan border as a response to the US decision to suspend roughly $ 800 million in military aid to Pakistan.

One can imagine that this tit-for-tat reaction from a minister who is indispensible to Pakistan’s security planning must have sent Admiral Mike Mullen, along with the joint chiefs committee, looking for cover. So indispensible is the minister that he was on a personal trip to the US — attending graduation ceremonies at Harvard, among other things — when the defence committee of the cabinet met twice in the wake of the OBL fiasco this past May. Can it not get more farcical than the security establishment firing from Chaudhry Mukhtar’s shoulder while General Kayani pretends to be a cool customer presiding over the corps commanders’ meeting?

Under the prevailing situation along the Durand Line, with both Pakistan and Afghanistan alleging that the other is violating the frontier, Pakistan would not venture into pulling back a single soldier. More than that, the Pakistan Army officials have declared on record that many of the Taliban-affiliated groups are their strategic assets. A pull-back would mean loss of protection for these assets rendering them to be likely targets for the ISAF, especially if the militants try to escalate things. So who is the Pakistani establishment kidding? Even the lamest bravado has to be tad tangible.

A few weeks ago, I had noted in these pages: “Osama bin Laden’s lair, less than a mile away from the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, is not a pinprick that the world, let alone the US, would forget so easily. The Pakistani parliament may have been duped with it, but there is every indication that the US Congress and the White House consider the ‘intelligence failure’ excuse an insult to their intelligence. Senator Kerry’s soft but measured tone indicates that the Pakistani brass still has some time, perhaps through July, to make serious amends but all options, including moving the UN, remain on the table. The senator also seems to have spelt out some of the bare-minimum metrics for any rapprochement...the dismantling of the Haqqani network is at the top of the confidence-building agenda. The military events surrounding Senator Kerry’s Pak-Afghan visits suggest that the US is not about to blink first” (‘Pakistan and the US: beyond the tailspin’, Daily Times, May 19, 2011).

So here we are in mid-July and the US has issued what is still a relatively mild rebuke, through suspension of the military aid. However, the way the geopolitical narrative in the post-OBL phase is shaping up, the current US measures have the undesirable potential of snowballing into more robust sanctions and further isolation of Pakistan. Both the US and Pakistan have few good options in the mini cold war, which they are fighting on the Afghan frontier but obviously the Pakistani choices are much more limited. The much-trumpeted Chinese support will subsidise neither the technological nor budgetary shortfall. Also, the détente that exists between the US and China and is not about to change soon. Admiral Mullen took off for China immediately after his remarks that implicated the Pakistani brass in Syed Saleem Shahzad’s murder. Short of threatening a regional destabilisation by militant proxies, including through blocking NATO routes, or its perpetual staple of ‘you cannot mess with a nuclear-armed country’, Pakistani deep state has little to fall back upon.

For some reason, the Pakistani establishment — and indeed a large section of the population — remains of the view that the world, especially the US, is out to get them and the regional and world powers are setting up tripwires for them at every step. This is followed by the perennial chorus about how the US ditched us after the Soviet withdrawal and the relations with the US having been transactional and utilitarian rather than strategic. The establishment, then, like Don Quixote, riding on his horse Rocinante –the right-wing media in this case — goes tilting at the US-Indo-Zionist windmills. But what really takes the cake is invoking the anti-US sentiment prevalent in Pakistan and how it will become worse if the aid spigot is turned off. What is lost on the Pakistani brass is that a zero-sum security paradigm is ancient history.

The Pakistani military leadership has been betting on a US withdrawal from Afghanistan that leaves the field wide open for them. It is an erroneous assumption and will likely result in the Pakistani security establishment biting off more than it can chew. It is equally wrong to assume that Afghanistan would portend any threat to Pakistan in foreseeable future. Also, in the wake of Ahmed Wali Karzai’s assassination, a continued US presence in Afghanistan after 2014 is almost a foregone conclusion. Three large US bases along with at least 25,000 troops, supported by robust air power is what the Pakistani brass will be grappling with if they are eyeing the Kabul throne for their chosen militants. The Pakistani civil and military leaders must recognise that their objective of imposing a 1996-style Pakistani puppet government in Kabul is neither legitimate nor attainable. After his brother’s murder, even the capricious Hamid Karzai — known for his occasional footsie with Pakistan — is unlikely to go along with any Pakistani designs on Kabul.

The mood in the US is reflective of an Americanism: “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” The Obama administration had bad and worse choices vis-à-vis Pakistan to select from. The US government is not known to rush into making decisions and the present one is no different. It appears to be a considered opinion of the US administration and the lawmakers that in the fight against the extremist forces, the Pakistani army and the civilian government cannot be counted on due to lack of will and power, respectively. What the US must not lose sight of is the difficult but imperative task of helping ensure a relatively stable Afghan government, without which a prolonged US presence in Afghanistan is meaningless. And equally important is continued US support for Pakistan’s democratic dispensation, which is likely to get caught in the crossfire as the mini cold war escalates.

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki